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ABSTRACT
The purpose of my dissertation is to identify factors driving corporate bond
pricing and government guarantees on corporate liabilities. In the first manuscript,
I identify the driving sources of asset growth from the perspective of debt financing
and examine the asset growth effect on bond pricing. There are competing views
on potential drivers for corporate asset growth. Researchers in favor of optimal
investment attributes a higher asset growth rate to lower cost of capital and richer
investment opportunities. Alternatively, the agency problem argument attributes
high asset growth to over-investments. Building on that firms often heavily rely
on debt to grow their assets, we differentiate these perspectives by studying the
relation between the bond yields and issuers’ asset growth rates. We do not find
that yields of bonds issued by high asset growth firms are lower than those of
low-growth firms. Moreover, we find that bonds issued by high asset growth firms
are potentially overvalued – they experience poor performance in years afterwards.
Overall, the results are aligned with the agency problem explanation for corporate
asset growth.
The second manuscript offers a novel approach to estimate the value of the
implicit government guarantee by combining the contingent claim pricing with the
likelihood of the government intervention. We find in our sample that the cost of
this implicit protection can go beyond tens of billions of dollars with an average
of about $13 million per company, per year, and it rises to about $24 million if
the government is assumed to intervene with certainty. We then investigate the
relationship between the implicit government guarantee and the funding costs of
small and large banks. The funding costs for both small and large banks are related
to the value of the implicit government guarantee. Moreover, we show that the
spread of the funding costs of small banks over large banks is strongly associated
with the value of the implicit government guarantee, especially after the crisis.
The corporate bond sector has grown tremendously over the past decade.
Rapid growth in Chinese corporate indebtedness and corporates ability to pay
back their liabilities have become a persistent concern for regulators and investors
in recent years. In the third manuscript, we examine the determinants of the
pricing of Chinese corporate bonds and potential agency costs arising from implicit
government guarantees (IGG) for state owned enterprises (SOEs). We show that
the yield of central government SOE bonds is 85 bps lower than that of non-
SOE bonds after controlling for firm-specific, bond-specific characteristics, and
macroeconomic variables. Further, quantifying IGG with (the lack of) bond yield
sensitivity to equity volatility, we present evidence on the dark side of IGG high
IGG firms are subject to greater agency costs; they are more likely to over-invest
to negative NPV project, suffering poor operating performance.
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Corporate Asset Growth, Debt Financing, and Bond Performance
Abstract
There are competing views on potential drivers for corporate asset growth.
Researchers in favor of optimal investment attributes a higher asset growth rate to
lower cost of capital and richer investment opportunities. Alternatively, the agency
problem argument attributes high asset growth to over-investments. Building on
that firms often heavily rely on debt to grow their assets, we differentiate these
perspectives by studying the relation between the bond yields and issuers’ asset
growth rates. We do not find that yields of bonds issued by high asset growth
firms are lower than those of low-growth firms. Moreover, we find that bonds
issued by high asset growth firms are potentially overvalued – they experience
poor performance in years afterwards. Overall, the results are aligned with the
agency problem explanation for corporate asset growth.
1
Corporate Asset Growth, Debt Financing, and Bond Performance
1 Introduction
Firms differ substantially in their asset growth rates. Based on the Compustat
database, from 1994 to 2014 the average asset growth rate weighted by corporate
market capitalization for firms in the top corporate asset growth decile group is
62% while the average asset growth rate of firms in the bottom decile group is -18%.
What may account for the large difference in corporate asset growth? This is a
very important issue to corporate profitability and efficiency. Regarding this topic,
people heatedly debate about whether there is an optimal asset growth and how is
asset growth associated with costs of capital and firm growth opportunities. Re-
searchers in favor of rational expectation suggest that asset growth is a realization
of a firm’s growth opportunities. Thus, firms with better investment opportuni-
ties and a relatively lower cost of capital would have a higher asset growth rate
(see, e.g., Hou, Xue, Zhang, 2015). On the other hand, behavioral economists at-
tribute firm asset growth to over-investments – if managers have empire-building
incentives, they may fund investment projects beyond the level that maximizes
shareholders’ value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). Under this view,
corporate asset growth may not be negatively associated with the costs of capital.
The optimal-investment and over-investment explanations have the same pre-
diction on corporate investment: asset growth and future stock performance are
negatively associated with each other. Such equivalence makes it hard to differ-
entiate between alternative explanations; To date the literature based on stock
performance remains unsettled on the main drivers for corporate asset growth.1
1Researchers in the behavioral camp attribute investors’ excessive extrapolation on past
growth to the negative asset growth effect on equity returns (e.g., Lakonishok, Shleifer, and
Vishny, 1994; Titman, Wei, and Xie, 2004; Cooper, Gulen and Schill, 2008). Alternatively,
researchers in the rational expectation camp focus on the association between investment and
expected return (Cochrane 1991, 1996; Li, Livdan, and Zhang, 2009; Liu, Whited, and Zhang,
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In this study, we shed direct light on the debate by analyzing yields and per-
formance of corporate bonds. The key rationale lies in that corporates heavily
rely on debt financing to grow assets. Therefore, bond yield is potentially a good
proxy for a firm’s marginal cost of capital. Further, a careful examination of bond
yields helps us understand the relationship between bondholders and sharehold-
ers, a critical source of agency conflicts. Moreover, biased investor beliefs play a
role in determining the value of corporate bonds. Recent studies show that bond
investors may overextrapolate past growth realizations in corporate bond markets,
leading to time-varying mispricing of corporate bonds (Greenwood and Hanson,
2013; Greenwood and Shleifer, 2014; and Greenwood, Hanson and Jin, 2016). Such
excessive extrapolation results in overvaluation of firms with high past growth and
these expectations will be revised after a period of relatively low asset growth,
resulting in a sharp decline in bond price.
Empirical predictions under rational expectation and agency problem expla-
nations are starkly different. Optimal investment suggests a negative relation be-
tween yield spread and corporate asset growth, i.e. high asset growth firms tend to
have low yield spread holding expected cash flow constant. In contrast, the agency
problem explanation indicates that high asset growth firms are not necessary to
be those with low cost of capital due to the over-investment and empire-building
tendencies. Further, when investors act irrationally and invest in overpriced bonds,
we expected a positive asset growth effect on yield changes after the asset growth
year. In other words, we expect to see that yields of corporate bonds increase
afterwards for high asset growth firms.
How much does a high asset growth firm use debt to finance their growth? To
address this question, we breakdown firm asset growth into major financing side
of the balance sheet. All firms combined, the contribution of retained earnings to
2009). High asset growth implies low cost of capital, predicting low future stock returns.
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financing activities of asset growth is 30% and the contribution of debt financing
is 74% for value weighted portfolios. In contrast, the contribution of equity is -4%.
Moreover, for firms in the top ten percentile of asset growth rates, nearly 80% of
financing activities of asset growth comes from debt; 8% is from internal funds (i.e,
retained earnings); new equity financing accounts for 12% of grown assets. These
findings confirms that high asset growth firms heavily reply on debt financing,
justifying the use of corporate bond yields as a proxy for the firm’s marginal cost
of capital.
We examine the determinants of asset growth rates by performing several
sorts. First sorting on lagged bond yields, we find an inverse U-shaped between
yield spread ranks and asset growth rates. Highest asset growth rates are not
firms in the lowest yield spread group. We then control for asset growth in the
prior year and check the relation between asset growth rates and lagged yield
spreads. Again, higher asset growth rates are not firms with relatively lower yield
spreads. The finding does not support the optimal investment argument. Second,
we sort firms based on asset growth rates and look at the yield spreads prior to
portfolio formations. Here we identify a U-shaped relation between corporate bond
yield spreads and corporate asset growth rates. Finally, to control for the effects
of growth opportunities and bond credit risk, we construct two-way sorts based
on asset growth rates and lagged returns on earnings (ROEs) (a measure of firm
growth opportunities used in Hou, Xue, and Zhang, 2015) and on asset growth
rates and bonds’ credit rating. The finding still suggests a nonlinear relationship
between lagged bond yields and firm asset growth rates.
We perform further analysis at the firm level to control for other factors that
potentially influence asset growth. The dependent variable is firm asset growth
rates. Besides lagged bond yield spreads, other explanatory variables include
4
squared yield spreads, firm size, leverage, ROE, credit ratings, and bond maturity.
The coefficient on squared yield spreads captures the nonlinear relation between
lagged bond yield spreads and asset growth rates. We find that, consistent with
conventional wisdom, firm size is negatively associated with asset growth. Also, as-
set growth are significantly positively associated with firm ROEs, suggesting asset
growth to be positively related to future cash flow. Most importantly, we find the
coefficient on yield spreads is significantly negative while the coefficient of squared
yield spreads is significantly positive. There is a U-shaped relationship between
asset growth rates and yield spread in the prior period.
What does the U-shaped relation tell us? It says that when the lagged yield
spread is low, corporate asset growth tends to be high. On the other hand, when
the lagged yield spread is high, corporate asset growth also tends to be high. This
basically suggests that when a firm has relatively low cost of debt, it may issue
more debt and pursue higher asset growth. This is consistent with the optimal
investment story. However, when a firm has a relatively high cost of debt, the
optimal investment rule no longer applies. This potentially suggests a role of the
agency problem based explanation for asset growth.
We look at, the bond level, how corporate asset growth rates affect yield spread
changes in the year after the asset growth formation year. Note that the yield
spread changes and bond performance in years afterwards help us identify if infor-
mation asymmetry between corporate insiders and bond investors indeed exists. If
bond investors are fully aware of issuers’ incentives, we would see that bond yields
stay constant after the asset growth year.2 On the other hand, when investors
cannot see through issuers’ incentive, we may observe the yields of bonds issued
by high-asset growth firms significantly drop in years afterwards. Our empirical
2From the firm perspective, if a firm decides to issue bonds to finance asset growth when bond
investors have the ability to see through managerial incentive, it pays a relatively high cost to
raise money. The risk appetite of such firms would be high.
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findings support the latter. We document a strong positive relation between asset
growth and yield spread changes after controlling for bond-specific characteris-
tics, firm-specific characteristics and macroeconomic factors. One percent increase
in asset growth rate is associated with 0.3 basis point increase in yield spread.
Furthermore, we find that the asset growth effect on bond yield spread changes
remains intact separately for firms with positive and negative asset growth rates.
For negative asset growth firms, a positive relation between asset growth rates and
yield spread changes indicates the most negative asset growth firms actually have
a most negative adjustment in bond yields. It appears that investors over-react
to the negative asset growth rates in year t (by setting a higher yield spread) and
correct it afterwards.
Our sample is rich in the sense that it includes the financial crisis period and
bonds of different credit quality, allowing us to perform further analysis. First,
we breakdown the entire sample period into three sub-periods: i) pre-crisis, ii)
crisis, and iii) post-crisis. We find that asset growth is negatively associated with
yield spread changes during the crisis period, while asset growth is positively as-
sociated with yield spread changes during non-crisis period. The implication is
that corporate managers are more cautious in their investments and are less likely
to overinvest during financial crisis. Meanwhile, investors tend to be rational and
make conservative investments when market condition is hard. We show that asset
growth has a negative effect on yield spread changes during financial crisis when
the agency problem and over-investment tendency are less pronounced. Second,
we separately look at the asset growth effects among investment grade and specu-
lative grade bonds. We show that the asset growth effect remains positive in both
rating categories.
Finally, we address the question whether asset growth can forecast excess
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corporate bond return, which is estimated 6 months after the formation of asset
growth portfolios. Controlling for both bond and firm specific variables, we find
that asset growth is negatively associated with future bond return. A standard
deviation increase in asset growth is associated with 0.5% decrease in bond annual
bond return. Note that bond return consists of two elements: one related to yield
spread changes and the other related the level of bond yields. As we are interested
in the change in bond yields after the asset growth measurement year, we further
decompose bond returns into these two elements. The finding indicates that the
negative association between bond return changes and asset growth rates is mainly
attributed to yield changes. Overall, our findings are in aligned with the agency
problem based explanation.
This paper contributes to the current literature of asset growth effect and
corporate bond pricing in several ways. First, we investigate the potential driving
sources of asset growth using corporate bond data. Using yield spread as the proxy
of cost of capital, we empirically distinguish rational investment expectation and
over-investment explanation by examining bond yields and corporate asset growth.
The existing literatures have debated whether asset growth anomaly is due to
over-investment or the evidence of rational expectation (Cooper, Gulen and Schill,
2008; Lipson, Mortal and Schill, 2011; and Watanabe, Xu, Yao and Yu, 2013).
Our evidence suggests that the asset growth effect is more likely due to the agency
explanation of corporate bonds pricing rather than rational expectation. Second,
we extend the study to changes in yield spreads. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001),
Campbell and Taksler (2003), and Chen et al. (2007) show that macroeconomic
factors, equity volatility and liquidity are important determinants of yield spread
changes. We find that an increase in asset growth is significantly and positively
associated with yield spread regardless of controlling for changes in credit rating,
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liquidity, macroeconomic influences, or other firm specific factors. The explanatory
power of asset growth persists for both investment grade and speculative grade
bonds. Third, this study is among the first to examine mispricing of individual
bonds. Using aggregate bond data, Greenwood and Hanson (2013) show that
investors tend to overextrapolate past growth realizations, leading to mispricing
of corporate bonds. In contrast, we extend the study of mispricing of corporate
bond pricing literature by examining the performance of individual bonds.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the
hypothesis. Section 3 introduces data and summary statistics. Section 4 explores
the driving sources of asset growth and examines the asset growth effect on bond
performance. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Hypothesis Development
In the pioneer works, Brainard and Tobin (1968) and Tobin (1969) argue that
the rate of investment should be related to its q, which is defined as the value of
capital relative to its replacement cost. Firms choose to invest in a project when
its q exceeds 1. This is the so-called q theory of investment. Subsequently, Hayashi
(1982) shows that in a perfect competition and constant returns to scale economy,
a firm’s marginal q (the market value of an additional unit of capital divided by
its replacement cost) is equal to its average q (the market value of existing cap-
ital divided by its replacement cost).3 Cochrane (1996), Liu, Whited and Zhang
(2009) and subsequent works derive the q-theory implications for cross-sectional
investment returns, which are tied directly to expected returns of individual stocks
to firm asset growth and growth opportunities. The logic is following: firms with
greater investment opportunities are more likely to make large investments, i.e.
experiencing greater asset growth. Nevertheless, holding firm growth opportuni-
3In fact, there are supports to the q-theory implications. See e.g., Cochrane (1991; 1996).
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ties constant, firms with lower cost of capital will engage in greater investments,
and vice versa. Therefore, the q-theory of investment predicts an inverse relation
between investments and expected stock returns, holding growth opportunities
constant.
There is evidence on the inverse relation between asset growth rates and stock
performance in the subsequent period. For instance, Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2015)
propose a four-factor asset pricing model based on q-theory and find this empirical
factor model can well capture a broad cross section of stock returns.4 Nevertheless,
as noted in the literature, stock performance does not necessarily reflect expected
returns. For instance, Greenwood and Shleifer (2014) show that stock returns are
inversely related to investor expectations of future stock market returns. This raises
serious concerns on the implication of empirical findings in explaining the q-theory
implication in the link between asset growth and stock returns. Consequently,
various studies alternatively use bond returns to derive equity prices and examine
equity pricing models (Campello, Chen and Zhang, 2008 and Phillipon, 2009).
Our study follows the same spirit as Campello, Chen and Zhang (2008) and
Phillippon (2009). According to the pecking order theory in corporate finance,
firms are more likely to use debt to finance a firm’s asset growth rather than to
issue equity. In particular, when debt is used for asset growth, the cost of capital is
correlated with cost of debt. A higher marginal cost of debt leads to a lower future
bond performance. In addition, after a relatively high asset growth, marginal q is
decreasing, leading to a lower cost of capital.
Following the investment-based model of Liu, Whited and Zhang (2009),
firms choose optimal investment to maximize the market value of equity. Let∏
(Kit, Xit) denote the maximized operating profits of firm i at time t. The
4Other studies, e.g., Fama and Frech (2014) obtain similar results, however, offer a different
explanation.
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profit function depends on capital, Kit, and a vector of exogenous aggregate and
firm specific shocks, Xit. We assume that the firm i has a Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction function, however, no longer with a constant returns to scale. End-of-
period capital equals investment plus beginning-of-period capital net of depreci-
ation: Kit+1 = Iit + (1 − δit)Kit, in which capital depreciates at an exogenous
proportional rate of δit. Firm incur adjustment costs when investing. We use a








Kit in which a > 0.
One-period debt is used to finance investment. Specifically, at the beginning
of time t, firm i can issue an amount of debt, Bit+1 (which must be repaid at the
beginning of period t + 1). In the meantime, firms pay back the bond, Bit. The
gross return on the bond is rBit . For simplicity, assume the corporate tax rate to
be zero. The payout of firm i equals:
Dit = Π(Kit, Xit) − Φ(Iit, Kit) − Iit +Bit+1 − rBitBit (1)
Let Mt+1 be the stochastic discount factor from t to t+ 1. Firm i maximizes






It can be shown that the optimal condition in terms of equityholder value




+ (1 − δi) (3)






The expected investment return in equation (3) is the ratio of marginal benefit
of investment at time t + 1 to the gross corporate investment rate at time t. In
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equilibrium, the firm’s investment return should equate the marginal cost of capital
of debt. When bond investors are marginal investors, expected investment returns




Jointly considering the above two equations, we expect bond expected returns,
E(rBit+1), to be inversely related to corporate investment,
iit
kit
, holding the benefit
of investment constant.5 All the securities are rationally priced under the optimal





+ (1 − δi) (5)
This leads to our first hypothesis:
H1. Holding expected cash flow constant, corporate asset growth is negatively
associated with bond yields.
The agency problem explanation predicts that firms grow more than the opti-
mal level. Controlling firm growth opportunities stay constant, high asset growth
firms potentially have a high cost of capital.
H2. For high asset growth firms, bond yields could positively associated with
asset growth rates.
The agency problem are prevalent in an environment with a great deal of in-
formation asymmetry. Investors could potentially over-, under-, or appropriately
react to the potential managerial over-investment incentives. The second hypothe-
sis is related to bond yield changes in the year after the asset growth measurement
year. If investors over-react to the managerial incentive, we would see bond yields
5Under the assumption of non constant return to scale, the unit productivity of new invest-
ments, It differs from that of existing assets, Kt.
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drop for high asset growth firms after the asset growth years. If bond investors are
fully aware of issuers’ incentives, we would see that bond yields stay constant after
the asset growth year. Finally, as pointed out by Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1994), investors may excessively extrapolate from firms’ past growth when they
value stocks. When investors cannot see through issuers’ incentive, we may observe
the yields of bonds issued by high-asset growth firms significantly drop in years
afterwards. In case that investors do not fully understand the agency problem of
over-investment, they may overvalue a firm with large investments by overvaluing
its potential future cash flows. The lower return subsequent to large investment
hence reflects a market correction of the initial overvaluation. The hypothesis is
as below:
H3. For high asset growth firms, bond yields increase in the year after the
high asset growth year.
There is a consistent expectation on the relationship between asset growth
rates and bond performance. We state the hypothesis alternatively in terms of
bond performance.
H3A. High growth firms experience bad bond performance in the year after the
high asset growth year.
3 Data and Summary Statistics
3.1 Data
The data used in this study come from several sources. First, the main trans-
action data of the US corporate bond market are obtained from the Trade Re-
porting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) database. Introduced in July 1, 2002,
TRACE provides information on secondary market transactions, including trans-
action prices, volumes, trade direction and the exact data and time of the trade.
We account for reporting errors using standard filtering procedures commonly used
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for the TRACE transaction data (see, Dick-Nielsen, 2014) )6. Similar to Lin, Wang
and Wu (2011), we also extend the sample to January 1994 using the data from the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) database. The NAIC
database consists of all transactions of publicly traded corporate bonds beginning
in January 1994 by life insurance companies, property and casualty insurance com-
panies, and health maintenance organizations (HMOs). Following Bessembinder,
Kahle, Maxwell and Xu (2009), we compute daily bond yield by weighting each
trade by its size. This approach puts more weight on the institutional trades that
incur lower transaction cost and should more accurately reflect the underlying price
of the bond. The month-end transaction is the last available daily price from the
last five trading days of the month7. To determine the yield spread, we obtain the
benchmark treasury rates from Federal Reserve Board. Then we follow Gurkaynak,
Sack and Wright (2007) and employ a parametric model to estimate yield curve.
The yield curve allows two humps, one at short maturities and the other at long
maturities. Yield spread is then defined as the difference between the bond yield
and the associated yield of the treasury yield curve at the same maturity. The
sample period is from January 1994 to December 2014.
We obtain the bond characteristic data from Fixed Income Securities Database
(FISD). This database contains bond issue- and issuer-specific variables such as
issue amount, maturity, provisions, coupon and credit ratings on all U.S. corporate
bonds maturing in 1990 or later. We merge our transaction data with bond charac-
teristics and eliminate preferred shares, non-U.S. dollar denominated bonds, bonds
with odd frequency of coupon payment, and bonds that are mortgage backed, asset
6These include (i) same-day trade corrections and cancellations; (ii) trade reversals which refer
to corrections and cancellations conducted not on the trading day but thereafter; (iii) agency
and interdealer transactions.
7Using the last transaction within the last five trading days of the month instead of that on
the last day helps increase the number of non-missing monthly observations. If there are no
trades in the last five trading days, the month-end price is missing for that month.
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backed or part of unit deals. To prevent the confounding effects of embedded op-
tions, we also exclude the callable, puttable, convertible, and sinking fund bonds,
as well as bonds with a floater. Finally, we mainly use the Moodys rating from the
FISD, but, if it is not available, we use the Standard & Poors (S&P) rating when
possible and drop bonds whose ratings we cannot identify.
Moreover, we get the financial statements of firms from the Compustat. The
firms are required to have positive total assets. To mitigate the backfilling biases,
a firm must be listed on the Compustat for 2 years before it is included in the data
set (e.g., Fama and French (1993)). We further exclude regulated, financial, or
public service firms. The main variable of interest is the asset growth rate (AG).
Following Cooper et al. (2008), the annual firm asset growth rate (AG) for year
t is calculated as the percentage change in total assets (Compustat data item 6)
from the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-2 to fiscal year ending in calendar
year t-1:
AGt =
Total Assetst−1 − Total Assetst−2
Total Assetst−2
(6)
To compute asset growth rate, we require a firm not have zero or negative total
assets in both years t-2 and t-1. We further winsorize asset growth rate at the top
and bottom 1% in each year to control for the influence of outliers. The equity
volatility is estimated using 252 daily return from the CRSP. Finally, we combine
firm accounting information with bond transaction and FISD bond characteristic
data using issuer 6-digit cusip. In the final sample, we have 447,543 month-end
bond transactions of 8,909 bonds of 1,551 firms from January 1994 to December
2014.
3.2 Summary Statistics
Panel A of Table 1 provides the distribution of the main variables used in the
analysis. Firm characteristics variables include asset growth (AG), total assets (in
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billion dollars), book leverage, pretax interest coverage (PIC), long-term debt to
assets (LTA), total debt to capitalization (DTC), operating income to sales (OIS),
net income to equity (ROE), and standard deviation of excess daily stock return
(Sdret). Bond characteristics variables include yield, yield spread (YldSpread),
amount issued (in million dollars), coupon, rating, and maturity. The variables’
descriptions are provided in the Appendix. Firm specific variables are estimated at
bond issuer level, while bond characteristics variables are estimated at bond issue
level. The mean (median) asset growth is 0.10 (0.05) with the standard deviation
of 0.25. The average asset growth rate is smaller than that reported in Cooper
et al. (2008) because in our sample, we consider firms with public debt issues.
These firms are large in size and have relatively stable growth rates. Bond yield
(yield spread) ranges from 2.59 (0.44) in the 5th percentile to 12.47 (9.93) in the
95th percentile. The average bond yield is 6.3% while the average of yield spread
is 2.09%. Credit rating is a widely used measure of corporate bond risk. We
obtain the Moody’s and the Standard and Poor’s ratings and convert ratings into
a numeric scale from 1 to 22: 22 = Aaa, 21 =Aa1 (AA+), 20 = Aa2 (AA), ... , 2
=C, 1 = D. Ratings 13 through 22 (Baa3 through Aaa) are investment grade and
ratings below 13 are non-investment grade. Bond ratings on average are 14.72,
suggesting a Baa1 rating (investment grade rating). Bond maturities are around
11 years on average.
Panel B of Table 1 presents the correlation matrix among these variables. As-
set growth is negatively associated with yield and yield spread. High asset growth
firms have lower yield and yield spread. In addition, yield and yield spread are
highly correlated. Liquidity, credit ratings, leverage, LTA, debts/cap, Sdret are
positively related to yield and yield spread. However, we also note that credit rat-
ings,PIC,income/sales and ROE are negatively associated with yield (yield spread).
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Overall, high asset growth firms are larger in size, higher in profitability, and lower
in liabilities. Yield (yield spread) is positively related to liquidity, leverage ratios
and equity volatility and negatively related to credit rating and profitability ratios.
Our sample is sorted into deciles based on their year to year annual asset
growth rates (AG). Panel A of Table 2 shows bond issuer characteristics of asset
growth decile portfolios. The high asset growth portfolio (Decile 10) contains
bond issuers with the highest asset growth rate and the time-series average of
value-weighted cross-sectional means of growth rates for these firms is substantial
at 62 %. Decile 1 issuers are low asset growth firms, with average annual growth
rates of -19%. Low asset growth firms tend to be firms that have low profitability
ratios (OIS and ROE), low interest coverage rate, high leverage and high equity
volatility. The high asset growth firms are the smallest firms in our sample with
the yearly average of $42.9 billion, but have the highest operating income to sales.
D7 tends to be the firms with the largest size. Panel B shows the bond specific
characteristics. Decile 1 has the largest yield spread with the average rating of
12.8. Decile 6, 7, and 8 contain bonds with the lowest yield spread and highest
credit rating. The yield spread of D10 is 2.15 with the rating of 13.66.
4 Empirical Results
In this section we conduct a series of empirical tests to investigate the poten-
tial driving sources of the asset growth effect. Asset growth effect has been well
documented in the equity market. However, the drivers of asset growth have been
largely ignored in this existing literature. First, we ask how does a firm finance
their growth opportunities. To answer this question, we decompose asset growth
and look at the subcomponents of asset growth from the financing side. Second, we
examine the determinants of asset growth. To do that, we perform several portfolio
sorts and conduct regression analysis. Next, we examine the asset growth effect
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on yield spread changes following the asset growth formation year. We further
decompose asset growth into its major components from both the investing side
and financing side of the balance sheet and ask whether the asset growth effect can
be explained by the subcomponents of asset growth. Lastly, we explore whether
asset growth can forecast excess corporate bond return.
4.1 Asset Growth Decomposition
Total asset growth captures the aggregate growth of a firm. To explore the
potential driving sources of asset growth, we break down asset growth of various
components with the emphasis of financing side. Following Cooper et al. (2008),
the asset growth financing decomposition is as follows:
Total asset growth(AG) = Operating liabilities growth(∆OpLiab)
+Retained earnings growth(∆RE)




Operating liabilities are defined as Compustat data item 181 minus debt fi-
nancing, i.e. non-debt financing component of total liabilities. Retained earnings
is Compustat data item 36 and is considered as the source of internal financing.
Stock financing is defined as Compustat data item 130 plus Compustat data item
60 plus Compustat data item 38 less Compustat data item 36. Debt financing is
Compustat data item 9 plus Compustat data item 34. Stock and debt are the main
tools for external financing. Other liabilities and shareholders’ equity are defined
as total assets less all the above asset categories. All asset growth components
are changes in these variables from the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-2 to
the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-1 scaled by total assets in the fiscal year
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ending in calendar year t-2.
In Table 3, we report the growth of various asset growth components in each
asset growth decile portfolio from the financing side. The number in each cell
reports time-series average of yearly means of asset growth component variables
from fiscal year t-2 to year t-1 scaled by total asset in the fiscal year ending in
calendar year t-2. We sort the sample into deciles each year based on annual asset
growth rate at the beginning of year t. There are several notable observations.
First, growth in debts accounts for large fraction of asset growth from the financing
side. Specifically, for the high asset growth decile, growth in debts contributes
62.9% (38.9%/62.4%) of the total asset growth for the value-weighted portfolio.
In the last three columns, we show the contribution of each financing component
(RE, Equity and Debt) to the total financing activities, including both internal and
external financing. For example, debt financing accounts for 79% of total financing
activities, while equity financing takes about 13%. This suggests that corporates
highly rely on debt as the major tool to finance their growth opportunities. Second,
the average growth in stock is -0.2%. More than 70% firms in our sample have
negative growth in stock. This is consistent with pecking order theory and suggests
that equity financing is not the main source for external financing. According
to the first two observations, asset growth firms are more likely to rely on debt
financing than on equity financing for asset growth, especially for high asset growth
firms. More interestingly, we find that negative growth firms tend to be firms with
negative changes in retained earnings and debt. We also note that for decile 5, 6
and 7, these firms tend to buy back their equities by using retained earnings or
debt.
The asset growth decomposition provides insights on the driving sources of
asset growth. High asset growth firms are more likely to use debt to finance their
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investments, while negative asset growth firms have negative retained earnings and
reduced amount of debt. The overall message is that corporates heavily rely on
debt for external financing. Therefore, bond yield is considered as a good proxy for
a firm’s marginal cost of capital, which indicates an alternative way to re-examine
the q-theory explanation by relating bond performance and asset growth firms.
4.2 Determinants of the asset growth
Q-theory of investment relates corporate investment to their cost of capital.
Hou, Xue and Zhang (2015) suggest that lower cost of capital and better investment
opportunity imply high marginal q and high corporate investment. According to
the conjecture based on q-theory of investment, asset growth is negatively related
to the cost of capital given expected profitability or cash flows. In other words,
firms are more likely to grow when their cost of capital is low. In contrast, agency
theory suggests that corporate managers have the over-investment and empire-
building tendency. Thus, corporates might grow aggressively even when the cost of
capital is high. In this section, we differentiate these two hypotheses by examining
the determinants of the asset growth.
First, we explore the relationship between yield spread and asset growth using
portfolio analysis. We calculate value-weighted yield spread and credit rating at
bond-issuer level. Then we sort bond issuers into quintiles each year based on the
yield spread at the beginning of the asset growth year. Results are provided in
Table 4, where the reported asset growth rate is the time series average of cross-
sectional means. The cross-sectional means are calculated using value weight. D1
has the lowest yield spread, while D10 has the highest yield spread. In column 1,
we show an inverse U-shaped relation between asset growth rate and yield spread.
D4 group has the highest asset growth rate. As suggested in Cooper et. al (2008),
the current asset growth rate is highly related to prior asset growth rate. To
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control for that, we conduct two-way sorts based on prior year asset growth rate
and lagged yield spread. Our findings confirm the inverse-U shaped relation. The
only exception is AG 2, which shows a negative relation between yield spread and
asset growth rate.
Next, we sort issuers into deciles based on annual asset growth rate in each year
and look at yield spread prior to the asset growth formation period. Moreover, we
create a no growth portfolio as the benchmark by sorting bond issuers into deciles
based on the absolute value of asset growth rate. We define the lowest decile as
the no asset growth portfolio. Table 4 reports the results, in which the reported
yield spread is the time series average of value-weighted cross-sectional means.
In Panel A, the first column reports average yield spreads of bond issuers on
asset growth-sorted deciles. Interestingly, we find a U-shaped relationship between
asset growth and yield spread. D1 has the highest yield spread of 3.98. This is
consistent with the conjecture of q-theory investment that firms tend to have low
growth rates when yield spread is high. Bond issuers tend to have lower yield
spreads as asset growth rate increases and reaches the lowest point of 1.59 for
D7. However, yield spreads of D9 and D10 are 1.76 and 2.59, respectively. The
difference between D10 and D1 is -1.39 and is significant at 1% level (t=-10.23).
We also note that the difference between D10-nogrowth is 0.46 (t=4.87), suggesting
that high asset growth decile has a relatively higher yield spread than that of no
growth or medium growth portfolios.
To control for the profitability effect, we conduct two-way sorts based on asset
growth rates and lagged ROE. We first sort the sample into three ROE groups (low,
medium and high). Within each ROE groups, bond issuers are further sorted into
asset growth decile portfolios. Results are presented from column 2 to column
4. Consistent with the previous findings, a U-shaped pattern remains across the
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asset growth portfolios within each ROE group. The difference between D10 and
no growth portfolio is 0.38 (t=5.32) and 0.69 (t=3.33) for medium ROE group and
high ROE group, respectively.
Following the above procedure, we also examine the asset growth and yield
spread relation in rating based subsamples. Specifically, bond issuers are first
sorted into quintiles (Q1 to Q5) based on the lagged rating. Q1 firms are rated
of B1 or lower; Q2 are rated between Ba3 and Ba1; Q3 are rated between Baa3
and Baa1; Q4 are rated between A3 to A1; Q5 firms receive the highest rating
with Aa3 or higher. Within each rating group, bonds issuers are further sorted
into asset growth deciles. Again, we confirm a distinct U-shaped of each rating
group. The difference between D10 and no growth portfolio is positive, but less
significant.
In Panel B, we focus on firms with newly issued bonds during asset growth
formation period. The offering yield of new bonds is considered as the marginal
cost of capital. We repeat the same process and sort bonds into asset growth
deciles. The results are strong and consistent with our findings in Panel A. Overall,
high asset growth firms are not the firms with the lowest yield spread. Instead,
they tend to have higher yield spread. The difference between D10 and no growth
portfolio is 0.4 (t=3.53) for all newly issued bonds.
Furthermore, we use regression analysis to examine the relation between yield
spread and asset growth rate. According to prior studies, we control for both firm
and bond characteristics that have been shown to be associated with firm asset
growth: prior year asset growth, ROE, total assets, and leverage. We also include
bond characteristics such as years to maturity and credit rating. The definitions
of these variables are provided in appendix. The model is specified as follows:
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AGi,t = α0 + β1Xi,t−1 + β2AGi,t−1 + β3ROEi,t−1 + β4Log(Assets)i,t−1
+ β5Leveragei,t−1 + β6Maturityi,t−1 + β7Credit Ratingi,t−1 + εi,t−1
(8)
where the subscript i, t refers to bond issuer i and year t. X is the main variables,
representing yield spread or bond yield of firm i. AG is bond issuers annual asset
growth rate of year t. We include the lagged-year control variables in the regres-
sions. We also consider firm-fixed effects to capture time-invariant heterogeneity
across firms, and standard errors to account for clustering at the firm level. In
addition, we include year fixed effects to capture the aggregate time-series trends.
We perform panel regressions and present the results in Table 6. First, we
examine various model specifications from column 1 to column 5. In column 1,
we only include yield spread as independent variable and the coefficient of yield
spread is -1.0626 (t=-8.22). To capture the U-shaped effect as we document in the
previous section, we include the squared term of yield spread in the regression. We
find the coefficient on yield spread is significantly negative and the coefficient of
the quadratic term is significantly positive, suggesting a U-shaped relation between
yield spread and asset growth rate. In column 3, we examine how firm characteris-
tics affect firm asset growth rate. As expected, current asset growth rate is positive
related to the prior year growth rate with the coefficient of 0.0293 (t=2.49). The
coefficient of ROE is 0.017 (t=2.93), suggesting that firms with more profits are
more likely to grow. Moreover, leverage and firm size are negatively related to firm
asset growth. In column 4, we include both yield spread and firm characteristics
variables. In column 5, we also add bond characteristics (years to maturity and
credit rating). In addition, we show that firms with higher ratings are associated
with higher growth rate. The most telling story is that the coefficients on the
squared yield spread term are positive and statistically significant across various
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model specifications. In the last column, we use the bond yield as an alternative
measure of cost of capital. Because when firms raise capital, their decisions are
based on both the level of capital and risk premium (yield spread). The coeffi-
cient on the quadratic term of yield is 5.85 (t=6.03), which is consistent with our
findings using yield spread as the proxy of cost of capital.
Overall, our findings document a U-shaped relation between yield spread and
firm asset growth. The U-shape relation holds when we control for both bond and
firm specific characteristics. Our evidence is not consistent with the hypothesis
based on the q-theory of investment. Instead, the potential driving sources of
asset growth are more likely due to agency based explanation. In the next section,
we examine the asset growth effect on yield spread changes.
4.3 Asset Growth Effects on Yield Spread Changes
According to the second hypothesis, the agency problem posits a positive
relationship between asset growth and yield spread changes. To test H2, we explore
the relation between asset growth and yield spread changes using portfolio analysis.
We sort bond issuers into deciles based on asset growth rate in each year and
estimate the yearly average yield spread changes from July of the asset growth
year t to July of year t+1. D1 has the lowest asset growth rate, while D10 has the
highest. Table 7 reports the results, in which the reported average is the time-series
average of cross-sectional means of the yield spread. The cross-sectional means are
calculated using value-weight.
In Panel A, we show average yield spread changes for all the bonds in our
sample. D1 has negative yield spread changes of -8.5 bps (t=-3.22), while D10 has
positive yield spread changes of 11 bps (t=3.7). More interestingly, we note that
yield spread changes are statistically insignificant for D3 to D7 deciles. According
to agency theory based hypothesis, the agency problem might be more pronounced
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when the asset growth is positive. Thus, we further divide our sample into positive
and negative asset growth sample. Further, we sort bond issuers into deciles within
each positive and negative asset growth group.
In the positive asset growth sample, we find that bonds issued by high asset
growth firms tend to have positive yield spread changes. For example, yield spread
changes are 8.1 bps (t=3.38) and 10.2 bps (t=2.58) for D9 and D10, respectively.
Yield spread changes are positive, but insignificant in other asset growth portfolios.
In the negative asset growth sample, we show that bonds with more negative asset
growth rate are associated with negative yield spread changes. Our evidence is
consistent with H2 that bonds issued by high asset growth firms tend to have
positive yield spread changes, while bonds issued by low or negative growth bonds
tend to have negative yield spread changes.
In panel B, we repeat the same process, but focus on the newly issued bonds.
We use the yield spreads of the first available trade after issuance for the current
period. We use yield spread in July of the following year as the next period. If
there is no trade in July, we use the next available trade. We confirm our previous
findings and show that asset growth is positive related to yield spread changes.
The magnitude and statistical significance of yield spread changes are smaller in
the newly issued sample.
Next, We conduct regression tests to study whether asset growth is a deter-
minant of yield spread changes. We include a list of independent variables used
in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Campbell and Taksler (2003), and Chen et al.
(2007). Specifically, we consider credit rating and liquidity. Liquidity is estimated
by the Amihud illiquidity ratio. We expect positive changes in liquidity to have
positive effect on yield changes. We also include four accounting variables: pretax
interest coverage, operating income to sales, long-term debt to assets, and total
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debt to capitalization. Positive changes of the first two variables indicate finan-
cially healthy firms and are likely to produce a low yield spread. Positive changes
of the second two variables indicate highly levered firms and imply a high yield
spread. We also compute the standard deviation of daily excess returns for each
bond issuer’s equity over the 252 days during the asset growth period. We expect
the positive change in the standard deviation of daily excess returns to have a
positive effect on yield spreads. To control for macroeconomic variables, we use
1-year treasury rate, the difference between the 10- and 2- year Treasury rates, and
the difference between the 30-day Euro-dollar and Treasury yields. The model is
specified as follows:
∆(Y ieldSpread)i,j,t+1 = α0 + β1(Asset Growth)i,t + β2(Credit Rating)i,j,t
+ β3∆(Liquidity)i,j,t + β4∆σEi,t
+ β5∆(PreTax Interest Coverage)i,t
+ β6∆(Operating Income/Sales)i,t
+ β7∆(Debt/Assets)i,t + β8∆(Debt/Capitalization)i,t
+ β9(1yr Treasury Rate)t
+ β10∆(10yr − 2yr Treasury Rate)t
+ β11∆(30 Day EuroDollar Rate)t + εi,j,t
(9)
where the subscript i, j, t refers to bond j of firm i at year t, ∆ represents the first
difference in each variable for each bond j, asset growth is defined as the year to
year annual changes.
Table 8 reports panel regression results of the full sample and newly issued
bonds over the sample period from 1994 to 2014 period. First, we examine vari-
ous regression specifications. In column 1, we only include asset growth rate. The
coefficient of asset growth rate is 0.459 (t=4.88), suggesting that one percent incre-
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ment of asset growth results in an 0.459 percent increase in yield spread change. In
column 2, we additionally include four accounting variables. The coefficient of the
asset growth rate is still significantly positive (0.3039, t=3.55). As expected, high
income to sales is associated with a significant decrease in the yield spread, while
higher leverage and higher equity volatility can lead to higher yield spread changes.
In column 3, we include firm specific, bond specific and macroeconomic variables.
The coefficients on asset growth remain significantly positive. One percent change
in asset growth is associated with 0.3 percent change increase in yield spread. In
addition, the deterioration of bond quality (rating) is related to a significant in-
crease in the yield spread. Similarly, a higher risk in liquidity leads to an increase
in the yield spread. This is consistent with the findings from Chen et al. (2007).
Furthermore, based on the unique feature of asset growth, we divide the sample
into two subsamples: positive AG and negative AG subsamples. The coefficients
on the asset growth are significantly positive. For instance, the coefficients on the
asset growth are 0.2276 (t=2.87) for positive AG subsample and 1.7645 (t=2.61)
for negative AG subsample.
Columns 6 through 8 show the results using the newly issued bonds for the
full sample and two subsamples. The results are similar to those using all the
traded bonds. One percent increase in asset growth is associated with 0.24 percent
increase in yield spread changes for newly issued bonds. The asset growth growth
effects are 0.26 and 1.67 for positive asset growth sample and negative asset growth
sample, respectively. Overall, the result in Table 8 shows that asset growth is sig-
nificantly and positively associated with yield spread changes regardless of whether
we include firm-specific, bond-specific, or macro-level variables in different sample
settings. Economically, a one percent increase in asset growth results in a 0.29
basis point increase in yield spread. For positive and negative asset growth firms,
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one percent increase in asset growth indicates a 0.228 and 1.76 basis point increase.
We also conduct robustness checks by examining the asset growth effect
through various sample periods: i) pre-crisis, ii) crisis, and iii) post-crisis. During
the recent financial crisis period, firms tend to have low asset growth rate due to
the bad market conditions. Corporate managers face financial constraints and are
cautious in how they invest. Thus, we expect that the firms tend to have less
over-investment tendency during the crisis. In the meantime, investors are more
rational and tend to make safe investments.
Following the NBER, the recent financial crisis is defined from December 2007
to June 2009. We define our sample before 2008 as the pre-crisis period, 2008 and
2009 as the crisis period, and after 2009 as the post crisis period. We repeat the
regressions in Table 8 and test for asset growth effect in different sample periods.
The results are reported in Table 9. Panel A of Table 9 considers the sample of all
bonds while Panel B represents the results for the newly issued bonds. We find that
the coefficients on asset growth for the full sample are significantly positive in pre-
crisis period and post crisis period while significantly negative in the crisis period.
This is consistent with our conjecture. The coefficient of asset growth is -1.64 (t=-
3.32), suggesting that asset growth is associated with lower yield spread changes.
Facing higher cost of capital and more financial constrains, agency problem tends
to be less pronounced. When we divide the full sample bonds into two subsamples
based on the asset growth rate, we find that the coefficients on asset growth are
significantly positive except for the negative AG subsample in the pre-crisis period.
In Panel B, the results on the asset growth are similar except that the coefficients
on the asset growth are significantly negative for both positive AG and negative
AG subsamples. Overall, the results suggest that the asset growth is positively
associated with the yield spread change in pre-crisis and post crisis period while
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negatively associated with the yield spread during the crisis period.
Furthermore, we examine the asset growth effect on both investment and
speculative bonds. Since bonds performance varies across various rating groups,
we ask whether the asset growth effect holds in investment and speculative grade
bonds. Similarly, we repeat the regressions in Table 8 for the bonds in two different
rating groups respectively and report the results in Table 10. Panel A of Table 10
considers the full sample bonds while Panel B represents the results for the newly
issued bonds. As we expect, the coefficients on the asset growth are significantly
positive for investment-grade and speculative grade bonds. They stay significantly
positive for the full sample and two asset growth subsample bonds. However,
when we look at the regressions for investment-grade and speculative bonds using
newly issued bonds, the coefficients on the asset growth become insignificant for
the negative AG subsample bonds. Overall, all the results consistently show that
the asset growth is positively associated with the yield spread change. In the
following section, to explore the driving sources of asset growth effect, we break
down asset growth into major balance sheet components from investment and
financing aspects.
4.4 Asset Growth Effect: Decomposition Results Explanation
As we have shown above, asset growth has a positive impact on future bond
yield changes. Our findings are more consistent with predictions from the agency
theory. In this section, we further explore the asset growth effect on bond yield
changes by examining various subcomponents of asset growth. In addition, we
examine whether the manner in which the growth is financed affects the yield
changes. One might expect that agency problem is more pronounced when corpo-
rate managers make large investments in physical assets or new equities and less
pronounced when firms invest in intangible assets or reserve more cash. Moreover,
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we expect that large expansion and rapid asset growth are more likely financed
with external financing sources.
In addition to the asset growth decomposition from the financing side of bal-
ance sheet as specified in equation (7), we decompose asset growth into 6 subcom-
ponents: cash growth, noncash current assets growth, property, plant and equip-
ment (PPE) growth, investment and advances growth, intangible assets growth
and other assets growth from the investment side. To maintain an asset growth
identity, each asset category difference is scaled by the previous years total asset
value.
We perform regressions of yield spread changes on the lagged components of
asset growth. We report results of the full sample in Panel A of Table 9. From
an asset investment standpoint, we find that increases in non-cash current assets,
PPE, investment and advances, intangible assets and other assets are associated
with significant positive coefficients. In particular, t-statistics for the coefficients
on the significant investment components vary from 2.07 for PPE to 3.87 for in-
vestments and advances. When we include all six investment components of asset
growth in the same regression, we find that changes in noncurrent assets, PPE
and investment and advances are positively significant, with growth in noncurrent
assets and investment and advances exhibiting strong effect (the t-statistics for the
coefficients is 3.29 and 3.87 respectively). It suggests that when firms make large
investments in noncurrent assets, PPE and investment and advances, yield spread
increases after the asset growth period. In addition, changes in cash and others
assets are negatively significant and the coefficient of changes in intangible assets
are not statistically significant. Our findings are consistent with our conjecture.
Corporate managers are more likely to expand in fixed assets, new equities or op-
erating assets when they have the over-investment or empire building tendency,
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while agency costs would be lower when firms reserve more capital to meet their
debt obligations. Another interesting finding is yield spread changes are unrelated
to changes in intangible assets.
In equation (7), we decompose total asset growth into 5 components: oper-
ating liabilities growth, retained earnings growth, stock financing growth, debt
financing growth and others shareholders equity and liabilities growth from the
financing side. We find that growth in debt financing and operating liabilities
growth are associated with positive yield spread changes. Specifically, growth in
operating liabilities and debt are associated with the strongest effect with coeffi-
cient of 1.7 (t=4.79) and 1.49 (t=4.14), respectively. As shown in Table 2, growth
in debts and growth in operating liabilities accounts for more than 60% and 20%
of total asset growth, respectively, suggesting that corporates heavily rely on debts
and operating liabilities when they grow rapidly. We show that the agency effects
are more likely to occur when firms realize growth opportunities by financing with
debts and operating liabilities. When we include all subcomponents of financing
growth variables into the regression, both debts and operating liabilities growth
variables are statistically significant, while growth in retained earnings and others
are negatively insignificant. The agency costs would be lower when firms finance
their investments using retained earnings.
We repeat the same process by examining the various growth components
in positive asset growth sample and negative growth sample. Results of posi-
tive growth sample are reported in Panel B. From the investment standing point,
growth in noncurrent assets and intangible assets are positive and significant;
whereas growth in retained earnings and other assets are negative and signifi-
cant. The intangible assets are still insignificant related to yield spread changes.
From the financing side, it is worth noting that changes in both equity and debt
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financing are positively related to yield spread changes, suggesting that there are
more pronounced agency problems when firms use external financing sources.
4.5 Asset Growth and Bond Performance
In the previous sections, we have shown that high firm asset growth rate is as-
sociated with high yield spread, suggesting that high asset growth is more likely due
to the over-investment incentives of corporate managers. Moreover, asset growth
is negatively correlated with future yield spread changes. As discussed in H3, bi-
ased investor belief can lead to mispricing of corporate bond. Overextrapolation
of firm past growth realizations in the presence of agency problem can result in a
sharp decline in bond values. In this section, we examine the asset growth effect
on bond performance and ask whether asset growth can forecast excess corporate
bond return.
Corporate bond return could be contaminated with mispricing. Due to the
agency problems, firms tend to make large investments regardless of the cost of cap-
ital and growth opportunities. On the other hand, investors may not see through
issuer’s incentives. Greenwood and Hanson (2013) show that bond investors over-
extrapolate firms with high asset growth and their expectations will be revised
after a period of relatively low asset growth, resulting in lower bond return. For
example, investors tend to be too optimistic of the future growth opportunities
of high asset growth firm and believe these firms will continue to grow rapidly.
However, these firms tend to over grow in the past and exhaust potential growth
opportunities, resulting in a relatively low asset growth in the following period.
Thus, we expect that asset growth is negatively associated with future excess cor-




Pt+1 + C − Pt
Pt
(10)
where Pt+1 is the bond price at year t+1, which is defined as the bond price
at the 18 month after the formation of asset growth portfolios; C is the annual
coupon payment; Pt is the bond price at year t, which is defined as the bond price
at the 6 month after the formation of asset growth portfolios.
Next, we express the above equation in terms of the log return: r = log(1+ret).
















+ log(1 + yt+1) (11)
where P
yt+1
t is the bond price estimated with yield at year t+1, all else being
equal. The first term is the yield change effect component on bond return and
the second term is the yield effect component on bond return. This is essentially
similar to the decomposition in Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997), however,
coupon bonds are used here. In the bond return decomposition, the firm term is
analogous to bond price change, i.e. Pt+1/Pt. The second term is analogous to
bond current yield, which is the ratio of annual coupon payment to the lagged
bond price. Bond price at year t is obtained from TRACE. To estimate P
yt+1
t , we
use bond yield at year t+1 and other bond characteristics from year t.
We perform panel regression to examine the asset growth effect on future
excess corporate bond return. The dependent variable is the return Reti,t+1 of
an individual bond i in excess of one year treasury rate at year t+1. We include
firm specific variables: asset growth rate, leverage, operating income to sales and
market to book (M/B) ratio. We also control for bond specific variables, such as
bond ratings, years to maturity and yield to maturity. All independent variables
are obtained at the end of the formation of asset growth portfolios. The model is
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specified as follows:
Reti,j,t+1 − rf,t+1 = α0 + β1(Asset Growth)i,t + β2Leveragei,t
+ β3Operating Income/Salesi,t + β4M/Bi,t
+ β5Credit Ratingi,j,t + β6Maturityi,j,t + β7Y ieldi,j,t + εi,j,t
(12)
Table 12 shows the panel regression results. In column 1 to column 4, the
dependent variable is the excess return of corporate bonds over one year treasury
rate. In column 5, the dependent variables is the yield change effect component
of bond return. In column 6, the dependent variable is the yield effect component
of bond return. The most notable observation is negative relation between asset
growth and excess corporate bond return across various model specifications. In
column 1, we only include asset growth as independent variable. We further control
for bond specific and firm specific variables for column 3 and 4, respectively. In
column 4, we control for both firm and bond specific variables. The coefficient
on asset growth is -0.023 (t=-3.41), suggesting that one percent increase in asset
growth can forecast a -0.023% drop in future bond return. In column 5 and 6,
we use yield change effect component and yield effect component as dependent
variables, respectively. As we expect, the negative asset growth effect on bond
return is mainly attributed to the yield change component. The coefficient on
yield change component is negative and significant, while the coefficient on yield
component is insignificant. In addition, our results also show that leverage and
years to maturity are positively related to future bond return. Income to sales,
M/B, rating and yield are negatively associated with future bond return. Overall,
the findings of bond return analysis is consistent with our conjecture.
33
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we empirically distinguish rational expectation and mispricing-
based explanation on asset growth anomaly by using corporate bond data. First,
we document a distinct U-shaped relation between yield spread and corporate
asset growth. The pattern holds strong when we control for bond- and firm-
specific characteristics using both portfolio and regression analysis. High asset
growth firms tends to be firms with relatively higher yield spread. We suggest
that asset growth is more likely due to the over-investment and empire building
tendency. Second, we show a positive relation between asset growth and yield
spread changes. High asset growth firms are more likely to have positive yield
changes. The positive asset growth effect remains strong across various sample
periods and rating groups. Our evidence is consistent with the conjecture of agency
problem. In the asset growth decomposition, we find that agency problem is more
significant when firms use debt and operating liabilities for financing and when
firm make large investments in fixed assets and new equities. Finally, asset growth
is positively associated with future bond return, which is attributed to the yield
change effect component. Overall, our empirical finding is more aligned with the
agency problem explanation of corporate asset growth.
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Appendix
The variables used in the paper are listed below (with Compustat data items in
parenthesis).
Asset growth (AG) is the 1-year percentage change in total firm assets
[(Total Assetst−1−Total Assetst−2)/Assetst−2], where assets are Compustat data
item 6. To compute AG, a firm must have nonzero total asset in both year t-1 and
t-2.
Yield spreads are defined as the difference between the yield of bond and the asso-
ciated yield of the Treasury curve at the same maturity. We employ a parametric
model to estimate yield curve following Gurkaynak, Sack and Wright (2007).
Pretax interest coverage is the ratio of [operating income after depreciation (data
178)+interest expense(data 15)] to interest expense.
Operating income to sales is [operating income before depreciation (data 13) to
net sales (12).
Long-term debt to assets is [total long-term debt (data 9) to [total assets (data
6)].
Total debt to capitalization is [total long-term debt (data 9)+debt in current li-
abilities (data 34)+average short-term borrowings (data 104)] to [total liabilities
(data 181)+market value of equity (from CRSP)].
Log(Assets) is the natural log of total assets (data 6).
Leverage is the sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities, scaled by
total assets [(long-term debt (data 9) + Debt in current liabilities(data 34)/total
assets(data 6)].
ROE is net income (data 172) scaled by total shareholder’s equity (data 144).
SDExret is the equity volatility, which is estimated using 252 daily excess stock
returns (from CRSP), for each issuer.
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10Yr is the 10-year treasury yield .
Treasury slope: we define the slope of the yield curve as the difference between
10-year and 2-year Treasury yield. We interpret this proxy as both an indication
of expectation of future short rates, and as an indication of economic health.
Euro is the difference between the 30-day Eurodollar and 3-month Treasury Bill
rate that controls for other potential liquidity effects on corporate bonds relative
to Treasury bonds.
Amihud is Amihud illiquidity ratio estimated based on bond returns and trading







N is the number of days with at least one trade on the bond during a year, and Rj
and Qj are the return and dollar trading volume on day j when there is at least a
trade. The return Rj is measured as the percentage change in closing clean price,
from the most recent day with trading to the last trade on day j.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A of the table reports the distribution of the main variables used in the analysis. Firm characteris-
tics variables include asset growth (AG), total assets (in billion $), book leverage, pretax interest coverage
(PIC), long-term debt to assets (LTA), total debt to capitalization (DTC), operating income to sales (OIS),
net income to equity (ROE), and standard deviation of excess daily stock return (Sdret). Bond character-
istics variables include yield, yield spread (YldSpread), Amihud measure (%), amount issued (in million
$), coupon, rating, and maturity. We assign integer numbers to the credit ratings (i.e., Aaa=22, Aa1=2, ...,
D=1). The definitions of the variables are provided in the appendix. The distributional attributes include
the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th percentiles, as well as the mean and standard deviation (Std Dev) of
each variable. We obtain each statistic each year and then take the average over time. Panel B of the table
reports the correlation matrix of these variables. The sample period is from January 1994 to December
2014.
Panel A: Summary Statistics
P5 P25 Mean Median P75 P95 Std Dev
AG -0.18 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.13 0.61 0.25
Yield 2.59 3.93 6.36 5.85 7.96 12.47 2.63
Yield Spread 0.44 0.81 2.29 1.80 4.35 9.23 2.54
Ratings 7.74 12.82 14.72 15.11 17.33 19.92 3.61
Amihud (%) 0.00 0.04 0.82 0.65 1.62 2.48 0.49
Amount Issued 167.4 302.7 678.6 495.7 841.6 1971.4 332.6
Coupon 4.39 5.72 6.78 6.69 7.72 9.48 1.59
Maturity 2.10 4.99 10.97 7.87 13.77 28.67 8.01
Assets 3.08 12.70 72.80 31.14 91.53 286.10 30.91
Leverage 0.10 0.20 0.32 0.29 0.40 0.59 0.21
PIC 1.39 3.69 10.35 6.77 12.22 35.74 11.41
LDA 0.07 0.16 0.25 0.23 0.32 0.48 0.19
DTC 0.04 0.11 0.23 0.19 0.31 0.53 0.16
OIS 0.04 0.12 0.21 0.19 0.28 0.46 0.17
ROE -0.18 0.06 0.16 0.14 0.22 0.55 0.38
Sdret 1.13 1.33 1.75 1.58 1.96 2.92 1.31
Panel B: Correlation
Yield Yldspread Ratings Amihud Assets Leverage PIC LTD DTC OIS ROE Sdret
AG -0.0416 -0.0855 0.0040 -0.1074 -0.0082 -0.0112 0.0261 -0.0063 0.0007 0.0118 0.0129 -0.0082
Yield 0.8833 -0.5184 0.3680 -0.3253 0.3198 -0.1176 0.2803 0.4546 -0.2776 -0.0616 0.4767
Yldspread -0.6113 0.3324 -0.3072 0.3401 -0.1049 0.3188 0.4789 -0.3079 -0.0634 0.4796
Ratings -0.1129 0.5536 -0.4622 0.1799 -0.5110 -0.6237 0.3668 0.0288 -0.3551
Amihud 0.1123 0.0165 -0.0540 -0.0180 0.1156 -0.1366 0.0048 0.1187
Assets -0.3116 0.0866 -0.3569 -0.2779 0.0074 0.0100 -0.2405
Leverage -0.1778673 0.9375 0.7943 -0.0601 -0.0240 0.2030
PIC -0.1714 -0.2164 0.2021 0.0067 -0.0605
LTD 0.7413 -0.0570 -0.0284 0.1776




Table 2: Asset Growth Deciles: Bond Issuer and Issue Characteristics
This table shows summary statistics of bond-issuer (Panel A) and bond-specific (Panel B) characteristics
for the deciles based on the asset growth at the fiscal year t. D1 represents issuers with the lowest asset
growth rate while D10 represents issuers with the highest asset growth rate. Issuer characteristics include
assets (in billions $), leverage, pretax interest coverage (PIC), long-term debt to assets (LDA), total debt to
capitalization (DTC), operating income to sales (OIS), ROE and standard deviation of daily excess return
(Sdret). We also include bond-specific characteristics, including yield, yield spread (YldSpread), credit
rating, amihud measure, amount issued (in millions $), maturity, and coupon rate. We assign integer num-
bers to the credit ratings (i.e., Aaa=22, Aa1=2, ..., D=1). Details on the construction of these variables are
provided in the Appendix. The number in each cell reports time-series averages of yearly cross-sectional
means over the full sample period (January 1994 to December 2014) across all bond issues and issuers.
Panel A. Bond Issuer Characteristics
Decile AG Assets Leverage PIC LDA DTC OIS ROE Sdret
D1 (low) -0.18 50.1 0.35 4.82 0.29 0.26 0.17 0.09 2.31
D2 -0.06 47.6 0.33 6.99 0.28 0.24 0.19 0.10 1.88
D3 -0.02 48.2 0.30 8.00 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.12 1.81
D4 0.01 75.7 0.33 7.11 0.27 0.23 0.22 0.12 1.68
D5 0.03 45.7 0.31 10.12 0.25 0.20 0.21 0.20 1.68
D6 0.06 89.2 0.33 9.47 0.25 0.25 0.20 0.14 1.64
D7 0.09 76.5 0.30 13.42 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.19 1.59
D8 0.13 46.6 0.27 14.60 0.21 0.16 0.21 0.18 1.63
D9 0.22 51.8 0.28 16.51 0.23 0.18 0.24 0.18 1.82
D10 (high) 0.62 42.9 0.32 10.57 0.27 0.23 0.25 0.14 1.91
Panel B. Bond Issue Characteristics
Decile Yield YldSpread Rating Amihud (%) Amount Issued Maturity Coupon
D1 (low) 8.15 4.42 12.78 1.51 699.0 10.64 7.19
D2 6.98 3.52 13.56 1.26 646.6 10.70 7.09
D3 6.74 2.48 14.13 0.99 632.4 10.96 7.01
D4 6.56 2.30 14.25 0.98 684.1 11.25 6.96
D5 5.97 1.82 15.11 0.82 611.5 10.91 6.70
D6 5.92 1.62 15.55 1.07 631.3 11.44 6.66
D7 5.80 1.52 15.82 0.87 634.5 10.78 6.58
D8 5.72 1.58 15.83 0.82 664.5 10.79 6.49
D9 5.93 1.84 15.22 0.79 655.3 10.66 6.59
D10 (high) 6.46 2.15 13.66 0.65 677.8 10.64 6.81
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Table 3: Asset Growth Decomposition
Asset growth is decomposed into various components from the financing side of the balance sheet. The
financing decomposition defines total assets as the sum of: (1) Retained earnings (∆RE: Compustat
#36), (2) Stock (∆Stock: Compustat #130 + Compustat #60 - Compustat #36- Compustat #88), (3) Debt
(∆Debt: Compustat #9 + Compustat #34 + Compustat #104), Operating liabilities (∆OpLiab: Compustat
#181 - ∆Debt), (5) and other Liabilities and Shareholders’ equity (∆OthLS:∆Total assets-∆RE- ∆Stock-
∆Debt-∆OpLiab). Asset growth decomposition variables are changes in these variables from the fiscal
year ending in calendar year t-2 to the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-1 scaled by total assets in
the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-2. Panel A reports time series average of value-weighted annual
changes in these variables over the full sample period (January 1994 to December 2014) across all bond
issuers. Panel B reports time series average of equal-weighted annual changes in these variables over the
full sample period (January 1994 to December 2014) across all bond issuers.
Panel A. Value-weighted Asset Growth Decomposition
Decile N AG ∆RE ∆Stock ∆Debt ∆OpLiab ∆OthLS RE Stock Debt
All 8584 0.0762 0.0158 -0.002 0.0386 0.0275 0.0145 0.3015 -0.0382 0.7366
D1 848 -0.1795 -0.0818 -0.0068 -0.0523 -0.0356 -0.013 0.5806 0.0483 0.3712
D2 860 -0.0624 -0.018 -0.0093 -0.0258 -0.0093 -0.0058 0.3390 0.1751 0.4859
D3 861 -0.024 -0.0087 -0.0063 -0.0185 0.0094 -0.0021 0.2597 0.1881 0.5522
D4 860 0.0049 0.0036 -0.0069 -0.0043 0.0115 0.001 -0.4737 0.9079 0.5658
D5 857 0.0285 0.0167 -0.0076 0.0008 0.0185 0.003 1.6869 -0.7677 0.0808
D6 863 0.059 0.0238 -0.0022 0.0086 0.0242 0.0047 0.7881 -0.0728 0.2848
D7 863 0.0889 0.0311 -0.0024 0.0249 0.0313 0.006 0.5802 -0.0448 0.4646
D8 858 0.1283 0.038 0.0075 0.0379 0.042 0.009 0.4556 0.0899 0.4544
D9 863 0.2232 0.0444 0.018 0.0814 0.0683 0.011 0.3088 0.1252 0.5661
D10 851 0.624 0.0403 0.0617 0.3821 0.1239 0.021 0.0832 0.1275 0.7893
Panel B. Equal-weighted Asset Growth Decomposition
Decile N AG ∆RE ∆Stock ∆Debt ∆OpLiab ∆OthLS RE Stock Debt
All 8584 0.0858 0.0151 -0.0015 0.0325 0.026 0.0088 0.3275 -0.0325 0.7050
D1 848 -0.1765 -0.079 -0.0122 -0.0532 -0.0312 -0.015 0.5471 0.0845 0.3684
D2 860 -0.0585 -0.0155 -0.0205 -0.019 -0.0121 -0.0057 0.2818 0.3727 0.3455
D3 861 -0.0208 -0.001 -0.0207 -0.0129 0.0025 -0.0033 0.0289 0.5983 0.3728
D4 860 0.0063 0.0055 -0.0175 -0.0045 0.0092 0.0012 -0.3333 1.0606 0.2727
D5 857 0.0291 0.0217 -0.0215 0.0026 0.0137 0.0053 7.7500 -7.6786 0.9286
D6 863 0.0544 0.0245 -0.0142 0.0122 0.0189 0.0068 1.0889 -0.6311 0.5422
D7 863 0.086 0.0363 -0.0171 0.0239 0.0281 0.0096 0.8422 -0.3968 0.5545
D8 858 0.1272 0.0403 -0.0025 0.0406 0.0392 0.0122 0.5140 -0.0319 0.5179
D9 863 0.2099 0.0523 0.0079 0.0854 0.0543 0.0217 0.3592 0.0543 0.5865
D10 851 0.6807 0.0459 0.065 0.3971 0.1487 0.0237 0.0904 0.1280 0.7817
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Table 4: Yield Spread Portfolios and Asset Growth
The table shows the time-series averages of value-weighted cross sectional means of asset growth. Each
year, we double sort issuers into 25 groups based on the yield spread and the prior year asset growth rate.
Q1 (Q5) represents issuers with the lowest (highest) yield spread. AG1 (AG5) represents issuers with the
lowest (highest) asset growth rate.
Full Sample AG 1 (low) AG 2 AG 3 AG4 AG5 (high)
Q1 (Low) 0.0912 0.0209 0.1237 0.1026 0.1281 0.1450
Q2 0.0995 0.0465 0.0406 0.0887 0.1375 0.1596
Q3 0.1186 0.1030 0.0973 0.1075 0.1712 0.1607
Q4 0.1516 -0.0001 0.0497 0.0979 0.1597 0.3655
Q5 (High) 0.0611 0.0233 0.0105 0.0853 0.1032 0.1715
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Table 5: Asset Growth Decile Portfolios and Yield Spread
The table shows the average yield spread of portfolios for all bonds and for the newly issued bonds re-
spectively. Each year, we sort issuers into deciles based on asset growth rates. D1 (D10) represents issuers
with the lowest (highest) asset growth rate. Yield spread is obtained at the beginning of the asset growth
year. All bonds are also sorted into three profitability groups and quintiles (Q1-Q5) rating groups. The
yield spread is the difference between the bond yield and the yield of a comparable maturity treasury
bond. We repeat the same process, but sort all bonds by the absolute value of asset growth rate. No asset
growth portfolio has the lowest absolute value of asset growth rate. Panel A reports yearly average yield
spread of asset growth portfolios for all bonds. Panel B reports yearly average yield spread for newly
issued corporate bonds. Newly issued bonds are defined as the bonds that are issued during the asset
growth year. All numbers are in percentage. Inside the parenthesis are the Newey-West (1987) adjusted
t-statistics with a 2 year lag. *, ** or *** signifies significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.
Panel A. Full Bonds
Decile
Full ROE Groups Rating Groups
Sample Low Medium High Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
D1 3.98 4.87 2.29 4.05 7.36 3.94 2.14 1.36 0.68
D2 2.89 4.49 1.87 2.70 6.67 3.64 2.20 0.91 0.54
D3 2.59 3.35 2.25 1.90 5.90 3.07 1.83 1.00 1.15
D4 2.40 3.41 1.79 1.52 5.89 4.06 1.74 0.99 0.71
D5 1.88 3.30 1.64 1.15 5.33 2.90 1.51 1.05 0.55
D6 1.68 2.95 1.65 1.14 4.33 2.79 1.61 1.08 0.66
D7 1.83 2.79 1.70 1.42 5.57 2.94 1.55 0.82 0.73
D8 1.59 3.12 1.79 1.15 3.84 2.72 1.65 1.03 0.53
D9 1.76 2.93 2.03 1.44 3.66 2.42 1.76 1.01 0.67
D10 2.59 3.13 2.13 2.48 5.93 2.95 1.68 1.29 0.94
NG 2.13 3.06 1.75 1.79 4.94 2.97 1.60 1.32 0.92
Spread -1.39*** -1.73*** -0.16 -1.56*** -3.55*** -0.99*** -0.46*** -0.07 0.26(10-1)
t-stat -10.23 -9.05 -1.49 -5.33 -4.97 -5.98 -5.78 -0.76 1.64
Spread 0.46*** 0.07 0.38*** 0.69*** 0.99** 0.02 0.08 -0.03 0.03(10-NG)
t-stat 4.87 0.51 5.32 3.33 2.49 0.13 1.34 -0.47 0.27
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Panel B. Newly Issued Bonds
Decile
Full ROE Groups Rating Groups
Sample Low Medium High Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
D1 3.79 4.58 2.37 2.85 5.97 4.43 2.37 1.13 0.52
D2 2.76 4.66 2.48 2.04 5.40 4.03 1.74 0.82 1.07
D3 3.13 3.81 1.91 2.14 5.88 4.03 1.88 1.01 0.48
D4 2.40 3.85 2.52 2.08 5.22 4.32 1.76 0.98 0.52
D5 2.21 3.04 1.93 1.55 4.69 3.57 1.78 1.02 0.42
D6 2.53 3.43 2.30 1.55 5.18 3.48 1.84 0.91 0.53
D7 2.05 3.84 2.18 1.44 4.27 3.21 1.92 0.99 0.55
D8 2.20 3.71 2.40 1.56 4.32 3.22 1.61 1.05 0.68
D9 2.39 3.18 2.43 1.87 4.52 3.18 1.72 1.14 0.50
D10 3.04 4.22 3.03 2.14 4.72 3.32 1.49 1.00 1.61
NG 2.64 3.47 1.95 2.23 5.49 4.28 1.73 1.01 0.42
Spread -0.75*** -0.36* -0.66*** -0.71*** -1.25*** -1.11*** -0.88*** -0.14 1.09**(10-1)
t-stat -6.29 -1.86 4.04 -3.69 -8.22 -5.22 -8.40 -1.47 2.01
Spread 0.40*** 0.75*** 1.08*** -0.09 -0.77*** -0.96 -0.24 -0.02 1.19***(10-NG)
t-stat 3.53 3.78 6.35 -0.48 -4.58 -4.77 -2.56 -0.21 4.42
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Table 6: Asset Growth and Its Determinants
This table reports results of panel regressions with firm and year fixed effects. The dependent variable is
asset growth. The panel is composed of various regressions speculations. We include firm characteristics
such as prior year growth rate, ROE, log (assets), leverage. Bond characteristics (credit rating and years
to maturity) are estimated at the bond issuer level. More details on the construction of these variables are
provided in the Appendix. Year dummies are omitted from this table. T-statistics are in parentheses below
each coefficient, and are adjusted for clustering at the firm-level. *, ** or *** signifies significance at the
10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Yldspread -1.0626*** -2.6838*** -2.9631*** -2.2423***
(-8.22) (-8.86) (-9.06) (-6.88)






Lag AG 0.0293** 0.0135 0.0119 0.0134
(2.49) (1.13) (0.99) (1.11)
Lag ROE 0.0171*** 0.0138** 0.0140** 0.0139**
(2.93) (2.48) (2.54) (2.54)
Log (Assets) -0.2424*** -0.2498*** -0.2648*** -0.2658***
(-15.70) (-16.48) (-17.38) (-17.40)
Lag Leverage -0.3252*** -0.2493*** -0.2091*** -0.2054***





Constant 0.1702*** 0.1899*** 2.1216*** 2.1914*** 2.0304*** 2.1748***
(8.09) (8.87) (17.05) (17.86) (16.51) (16.92)
Observations 8,375 8,375 8,375 8,375 8,375 8,375
Adj. R-sq 0.250 0.255 0.340 0.357 0.364 0.364
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Table 7: Asset Growth Deciles: Yield and Yield Spread Changes
This table reports average yield spreads and yield spread changes across deciles based on asset growth. For all bonds sample, yield spread in year t is defined as
the yield spread at the beginning of the asset growth year. Yield spread in year t+1 is the first available monthly transaction 6 months after asset growth year. For
newly issued bonds, we use the yield spread of the first available trade after bond issuance. D1 decile has the highest asset growth rates. All the numbers reported
are in percent. Inside the parenthesis are the Newey-West (1987) adjusted t-statistics with a 2 year lag. *, ** or *** signifies significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1%
level, respectively.
Panel A. All Bonds
Full Sample Positive AG Negative AG
Decile t t+1 Change t-stat t t+1 Change t-stat t t+1 Change t-stat
D1 (Low) 4.47 4.39 -0.085*** -3.22 2.10 2.11 0.016 0.60 4.84 4.75 -0.089*** -3.40
D2 3.82 3.70 -0.123** -2.39 2.17 2.19 0.018 0.68 4.76 4.60 -0.155*** -3.71
D3 2.80 2.71 -0.094 -1.17 1.78 1.78 0.005 0.07 4.25 4.15 -0.106*** -3.36
D4 2.42 2.49 0.069 0.81 1.75 1.79 0.039 0.74 3.94 3.75 -0.189*** -2.76
D5 2.01 1.84 -0.170 1.02 1.75 1.76 0.041 0.64 3.32 3.20 -0.119** -2.39
D6 1.84 1.89 0.053 0.43 1.63 1.57 -0.066 -0.34 3.30 3.19 -0.114 -0.66
D7 1.75 1.70 -0.057 -0.47 1.56 1.57 0.020 1.25 3.20 3.04 -0.157 -1.32
D8 1.59 1.68 0.085* 1.86 1.62 1.70 0.080** 2.25 2.90 2.95 0.045 1.54
D9 1.84 1.91 0.067*** 2.92 1.91 1.99 0.081*** 2.58 2.60 2.67 0.066 1.17
D10 (High) 2.13 2.24 0.110*** 3.70 2.14 2.24 0.102*** 3.38 2.21 2.23 0.023 0.76
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Panel B. Newly Issued Bonds
Full Sample Positive AG Negative AG
Decile t t+1 Change t-stat t t+1 Change t-stat t t+1 Change t-stat
D1 (Low) 4.33 4.12 -0.202** -2.08 2.18 2.23 0.052 0.66 4.57 4.20 -0.364** -2.40
D2 2.89 2.85 -0.045** -2.01 2.37 2.29 -0.079 -0.03 4.31 4.21 -0.095** -1.98
D3 2.37 2.33 -0.046 -1.46 1.88 1.86 -0.023 -1.28 3.67 3.58 -0.089 -1.32
D4 2.14 2.15 0.006 0.65 1.89 1.76 -0.132 -1.40 2.64 2.77 0.134 1.40
D5 2.14 2.09 -0.055 -0.68 1.83 1.92 0.089 0.76 3.40 3.26 -0.140 -0.74
D6 1.74 1.68 -0.054 -1.15 2.14 2.21 0.079 0.56 3.18 3.26 0.074 0.63
D7 1.67 1.69 0.018 0.23 2.03 2.14 0.112 1.20 2.75 2.65 -0.101 -0.89
D8 2.12 2.25 0.132 1.43 2.15 2.25 0.100 1.31 2.75 2.81 0.057 0.29
D9 2.21 2.27 0.059 1.22 2.26 2.36 0.104* 1.78 2.85 2.98 0.133 0.61
D10 (High) 2.42 2.52 0.098*** 3.34 2.42 2.55 0.132*** 2.86 2.64 2.74 0.103 1.10
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Table 8: Asset Growth Effect on Yield Spread Changes
The yield spread change determinants are based on firm-specific characteristics, bond-specific effects, macroeconomic variables. Annual changes in all variables
are examined for 1994-2014 period. The liquidity is estimated by the Amihud measure. We use a cardinal scale for all bonds, regardless of whether they are
investment grade or speculative grade bonds, ranging from 1 for C rated bonds, to 22 for Aaa rated bonds. The firm specific characteristics are operating income
to sales, long-term debt to assets, total debt to capitalization, and excess stock daily volatility. T-note rate is the 1 year Treasury rate. Term-slope is the difference
between the 10 year and 2 year Treasury rates. Eurodollar refers to the difference between the 30-day Eurodollar rate and the 3-month T-bill rate. More details
on the construction of these variables are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. The issuer is the fixed effect. *, ** or *** signifies
significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.
Full Sample Newly Issued Bonds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Full Full Full Positive AG Negative AG Full Positive AG Negative AG
Asset Growth 0.4590*** 0.3039*** 0.2984*** 0.2276*** 1.7645*** 0.2442*** 0.2599*** 1.6675***
(4.88) (3.55) (3.62) (2.87) (2.61) (3.82) (2.70) (2.69)
∆ (Rating) -0.4104*** -0.4531*** -0.3793*** -0.4408*** -0.4622*** -0.4776***
(-13.83) (-10.09) (-8.36) (-6.25) (-5.70) (-2.69)
∆ (Amihud) 0.3362*** 0.4130*** 0.2100*** 0.3142*** 0.2170*** 0.1703***
(5.65) (5.20) (3.72) (4.71) (3.20) (3.45)
∆ (Pre-Tax -0.0043 0.0003 0.0026 -0.0199 -0.0011 0.0001 0.0432
Interest) (-1.51) (0.12) (1.27) (-1.62) (-0.47) (0.03) (0.56)
∆ (Income -2.4387*** -1.9924*** -0.0038 -6.2593*** 1.9213** 2.0593** 1.4623
to Sales) (-5.21) (-4.58) (-0.01) (-5.10) (2.20) (2.23) (0.32)
∆ (LT Debt -0.9527* -1.5833*** -1.2464*** -1.8628 -0.1862 0.4899 3.2638
to Assets) (-1.74) (-3.04) (-2.95) (-1.40) (-0.22) (0.49) (0.76)
∆ (Debt to 5.6840*** 4.5415*** 3.8940*** 5.7244*** 1.1183 1.1016 1.9567
Capital) (9.43) (7.83) (8.07) (4.48) (1.17) (1.06) (0.52)
∆ (Sdret) 0.9645*** 0.4843*** 0.3927*** 0.5711*** -0.0923 0.1096 -0.5668***
(20.97) (9.83) (8.12) (6.81) (-1.37) (1.40) (-2.73)
∆ (T-note) 0.3466*** 0.3026*** 0.5356*** 0.9831*** 0.7977*** 1.3726***
(13.79) (11.89) (7.36) (11.02) (8.20) (3.17)
∆ (Term slope) 0.3821*** 0.3842*** 0.5914*** 1.3211*** 1.1683*** 2.0500***
(14.85) (14.30) (6.69) (10.76) (9.20) (2.77)
∆ (Eurodollar) 1.7656*** 1.5112*** 2.1274*** 1.4591*** 1.4168*** 1.5446***
(26.29) (23.44) (14.67) (10.55) (8.94) (2.97)
Constant 0.0511** 0.3002*** 0.2262*** 0.2244*** 0.3618*** 0.4726*** 0.5708*** 0.1934
(2.37) (14.09) (11.73) (11.20) (5.17) (6.49) (6.88) (0.53)
Observations 22,178 22,178 22,178 15,415 6,763 2,892 2,327 565
Adj. R-sq 0.148 0.282 0.356 0.389 0.502 0.623 0.677 0.804
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Table 9: Asset Growth Effect: Pre-crisis, Crisis and Post Crisis Periods
The yield spread change determinants are based on firm-specific characteristics, bond-specific effects, macroeconomic variables. Annual changes in all variables
are examined for 1994-2014 period. Following the NBER, the recent financial crisis defined from December 2007 to June 2009. The liquidity is estimated by the
Amihud measure. We use a cardinal scale for all bonds, regardless of whether they are investment grade or speculative grade bonds, ranging from 1 for C rated
bonds, to 22 for Aaa rated bonds. The firm specific characteristics are operating income to sales, long-term debt to assets, total debt to capitalization, and excess
stock daily volatility. T-note rate is the 1 year Treasury rate. Term-slope is the difference between the 10 year and 2 year Treasury rates. Eurodollar refers to
the difference between the 30-day Eurodollar rate and the 3-month T-bill rate. More details on the construction of these variables are provided in the Appendix.
T-statistics are presented in parentheses. The issuer is the fixed effect. *, ** or *** signifies significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.
Panel A. Full Sample
Pre-Crisis Period Crisis Period Post Crisis Period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Full Positive AG Negative AG Full Positive AG Negative AG Full Positive AG Negative AG
Asset Growth 0.1326* 0.2373*** -2.7598** -1.6367*** 1.0232* 1.0698 0.3961*** 0.2886*** 2.4993***
(1.89) (2.99) (-2.52) (-3.32) (1.80) (0.25) (4.10) (3.13) (3.02)
∆ (Rating) -0.2581*** -0.3428*** -0.1052 -0.4727*** -0.0611 -0.4446* -0.4410*** -0.5261*** -0.4240***
(-5.31) (-5.96) (-1.29) (-3.79) (-0.43) (-1.94) (-12.43) (-9.65) (-7.72)
∆ (Amihud) 0.2118*** 0.2306*** 0.1300** 0.4578*** 0.3126** 0.1578*** 0.1880*** 0.1659*** 0.1279***
(6.32) (4.51) (2.12) (12.16) (7.85) (5.65) (7.36) (5.39) (4.87)
∆ (Pre-Tax -0.0038 0.0025 -0.0144 -0.0913*** -0.0613*** 0.2801* -0.0021 -0.0017 -0.0061
Interest) (-1.29) (1.02) (-1.01) (-4.99) (-4.64) (1.85) (-0.43) (-0.46) (-0.33)
∆ (Income -0.7007 0.2370 -3.8929*** -1.6991 1.2111 -18.8753*** -4.0128*** 0.3041 -12.0094***
to Sales) (-1.57) (0.57) (-2.71) (-0.82) (0.65) (-3.25) (-5.22) (0.46) (-6.11)
∆ (LT Debt -1.4010* -0.0587 -4.5372** 4.0192* -3.3348* 5.3197 -1.4472** -1.6255*** -1.1930
to Assets) (-1.73) (-0.06) (-2.23) (1.65) (-1.72) (0.58) (-2.23) (-3.02) (-0.75)
∆ (Debt to 6.0500*** 5.8121*** 8.4525*** 1.5197 4.3894*** 6.0018 3.7726*** 3.5614*** 5.0717***
Capital) (6.61) (6.32) (3.75) (0.73) (3.03) (0.94) (5.41) (6.18) (3.32)
∆ (Sdret) 0.8553*** 0.3799*** 1.0898*** 2.4203*** 0.8820*** 2.4579*** 0.5607*** 0.4724*** 0.6548***
(10.52) (4.76) (7.28) (14.68) (5.87) (7.25) (9.73) (8.34) (6.78)
∆ (T-note) 0.5891*** 0.3781*** 1.1397*** 0.9345*** -0.1588 0.4084 0.6608*** 0.5657*** 0.9629***
(14.88) (8.62) (12.08) (5.76) (-1.00) (1.02) (13.83) (11.63) (6.15)
∆ (Term slope) 0.1665*** 0.2217*** 0.3578*** 0.1689*** 0.2492*** 0.1931** 0.8644*** 0.7911*** 1.2996***
(6.25) (7.12) (3.78) (6.34) (8.35) (1.99) (13.31) (11.79) (5.95)
∆ (Eurodollar) 1.2277*** 1.0460*** 1.8738*** 1.7523*** 1.6879*** 2.2678*** 1.7512*** 1.4625*** 2.0503***
(16.17) (12.66) (10.27) (26.52) (25.57) (13.99) (25.13) (21.72) (12.67)
Constant 0.0885*** 0.0033 0.2607*** 0.2004 -1.1639*** -1.4677* 0.3069*** 0.3375*** 0.4099***
(3.41) (0.11) (2.67) (0.66) (-3.65) (-1.77) (11.38) (12.59) (4.18)
Observations 9,400 6,424 2,976 2,918 1,591 1,327 15,696 10,582 5,114
Adj. R-sq 0.398 0.523 0.563 0.599 0.900 0.708 0.378 0.428 0.537
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Panel B. Newly Issued Bonds
Pre-Crisis Period Crisis Period Post Crisis Period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Full Positive AG Negative AG Full Positive AG Negative AG Full Positive AG Negative AG
Asset Growth 0.1531** 0.1146** -0.3266 -3.0474** -6.2121** -12.4808* 0.7449** 0.9469** 3.5123***
(2.07) (1.97) (-0.06) (-2.47) (-2.53) (-2.01) (2.21) (2.05) (5.93)
∆ (Rating) -0.4398*** -0.4347*** -0.5471*** 0.2877 0.2502 0.6886 -0.1078 -0.1169 0.2550
(-5.63) (-5.96) (-3.33) (0.87) (0.71) (1.37) (-1.18) (-1.26) (0.72)
∆ (Amihud) 0.1198*** 0.1856*** 0.1201* 0.4214*** 0.3500*** 0.4136** 0.1671*** 0.1781*** 0.1252***
(4.31) (3.51) (1.81) (6.88) (7.36) (6.81) (4.60) (3.32) (4.21)
∆ (Pre-Tax -0.0147 -0.0173 0.0134 -0.0134 0.1079** 1.1837*** 0.0012 0.0027 2.4011***
Interest) (-1.22) (-1.34) (0.13) (-0.25) (2.50) (4.88) (0.56) (1.25) (3.46)
∆ (Income 4.8152 6.2203 -1.2761 1.3669 -17.9216*** -20.3589*** 0.5412 0.5954 -102.2458***
to Sales) (1.35) (1.50) (-0.23) (0.24) (-2.96) (-3.94) (1.32) (1.62) (-3.43)
∆ (LT Debt -2.1036** -2.5742** 3.6624 -7.0514 -9.5387 -9.6369 -2.3171 0.1484 75.6373***
to Assets) (-2.01) (-2.01) (0.75) (-0.93) (-1.31) (-1.11) (-1.63) (0.15) (4.65)
∆ (Debt to 1.0734 2.2597* -4.9872 4.7357 -8.3020 4.9769* -1.7372 -4.0676* 4.8977
Capital) (0.92) (1.77) (-1.43) (0.91) (-1.06) (1.87) (-0.84) (-1.89) (0.35)
∆ (Sdret) 0.1214 0.1899* 0.1849 0.2677 -0.1707 -1.1654** -0.2621** -0.1108 -1.3839***
(1.20) (1.65) (0.68) (0.76) (-0.21) (-2.52) (-2.20) (-0.56) (-6.66)
∆ (T-note) 1.2498*** 1.0601*** 1.7786*** 0.5746 0.3096 -4.6656** -2.1986 -0.6555 -66.0958***
(8.53) (5.86) (2.93) (1.29) (0.47) (-2.54) (-1.12) (-0.31) (-4.12)
∆ (Term slope) 2.3218*** 1.9972*** 3.5911*** 2.3670*** 1.5398*** 2.6426*** -0.0292 0.1528 -6.9676***
(9.25) (6.52) (3.04) (4.27) (3.95) -3.89 (-0.11) (0.53) (-3.11)
∆ (Eurodollar) 4.3351*** 3.5689*** 5.6792*** 0.3199 0.1140 0.2160 -1.5145*** -1.6639*** 10.2306***
(9.43) (6.83) (3.47) (1.16) (0.34) (0.54) (-2.73) (-2.85) (3.77)
Constant 0.4684*** 0.4639*** 0.0277 -0.2698 1.1667 -2.1033 -0.7749*** -0.5052* 5.6697
(4.45) (3.75) (0.07) (-0.28) (0.82) (-0.97) (-3.02) (-1.73) (0.98)
Observations 1,681 1,348 333 267 208 140 799 667 132
Adj. R-sq 0.689 0.705 0.904 0.835 0.849 0.956 0.850 0.901 0.957
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Table 10: Asset Growth Effect: Investment Grade and Speculative Grade Bonds
The yield spread change determinants are based on firm-specific characteristics, bond-specific effects,
macroeconomic variables. We use a cardinal scale for all bonds, regardless of whether they are invest-
ment grade or speculative grade bonds, ranging from 1 for C rated bonds, to 22 for Aaa rated bonds. The
firm specific characteristics are operating income to sales, long-term debt to assets, total debt to capitaliza-
tion, excess stock daily return and equity volatility. T-note rate is the 1 year Treasury rate. Term-slope is
the difference between the 10 year and 2 year Treasury rates. Eurodollar refers to the difference between
the 30-day Eurodollar rate and the 3-month T-bill rate. More details on the construction of these variables
are provided in the Appendix. Investment grade bonds are numbered from 13 (Baa3 rated bonds) to 22
(Aaa rated bonds). Speculative grade bonds are numbered from 1 (C rated bonds) to 12 (Ba1 rated bonds).
The issuer is the fixed effect. *, ** or *** signifies significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.
Panel A. Full Sample
Investment Grade Bonds Speculative Grade Bonds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Positive AG Negative AG Full Positive AG Negative AG
Asset Growth 0.1614*** 0.2192*** 0.5078 0.4691*** 0.5100*** 4.1944***
(3.08) (3.64) (1.03) (2.66) (2.78) (3.47)
∆ (Rating) -0.2879*** -0.3046*** -0.3854*** -0.5086*** -0.5192*** -0.4987***
(-10.40) (-8.20) (-6.39) (-10.04) (-5.99) (-7.10)
∆ (Amihud) 0.2909** 0.2306*** 0.1354** 1.1513*** 1.1365** 1.4616**
(2.34) (2.89) (2.26) (3.26) (2.20) (2.43)
∆ (Pre-Tax 0.0009 0.0007 -0.0024 -0.0298* -0.0122 -0.0590
Interest) (0.56) (0.47) (-0.29) (-1.68) (-0.72) (-1.61)
∆ (Income 0.0993 0.8351** -1.6275** -1.9500** 0.5094 -5.7594***
to Sales) (0.38) (2.24) (-2.20) (-2.53) (0.78) (-3.23)
∆ (LT Debt -0.6701*** -0.8980*** -0.4421 -2.7186** -2.5262** -2.1406
to Assets) (-2.89) (-3.26) (-0.81) (-2.52) (-2.47) (-0.98)
∆ (Debt to 2.1679*** 2.1144*** 3.5075*** 5.9271*** 4.6727*** 6.1535***
Capital) (7.26) (6.23) (5.20) (5.53) (4.64) (3.08)
∆ (Sdret) 0.0715** 0.1575*** -0.2706*** 0.4536*** 0.5641*** 0.5116***
(2.44) (4.47) (-4.25) (5.51) (4.91) (4.56)
∆ (T-note) 0.2757*** 0.2490*** 0.3972*** 0.5867*** 0.5524*** 0.7130***
(17.90) (13.78) (8.81) (7.30) (5.67) (4.00)
∆ (Term slope) 0.2235*** 0.2328*** 0.3189*** 0.8706*** 0.9831*** 0.9693***
(14.14) (13.52) (5.48) (9.92) (8.83) (4.55)
∆ (Eurodollar) 1.2567*** 1.2560*** 1.3692*** 3.7875*** 3.1871*** 4.1651***
(35.67) (32.14) (15.31) (18.41) (10.48) (13.47)
Constant 0.1281*** 0.1348*** 0.1259*** 0.2392*** 0.3410*** 0.5242***
(11.02) (9.81) (3.40) (3.73) (4.36) (3.18)
Observations 15,902 11,993 3,909 6,276 3,422 2,854
Adj. R-sq 0.323 0.352 0.398 0.447 0.501 0.564
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Panel B. Newly Issued Bonds
Investment Grade Bonds Speculative Grade Bonds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Positive AG Negative AG Full Positive AG Negative AG
Asset Growth 0.5407*** 0.5061*** -1.8212 0.3205*** 0.2061*** 6.5001
(3.88) (3.00) (-0.72) (3.57) (2.88) (1.02)
∆ (Rating) -0.2553*** -0.2780*** -0.0060 -0.6265*** -0.7747*** -0.4463
(-3.70) (-3.47) (-0.04) (-3.96) (-4.28) (-1.47)
∆ (Amihud) 0.1819** 0.2203*** 0.1885** 1.1626** 1.2600** 1.4616
(2.20) (2.91) (2.54) (2.44) (2.08) (1.35)
∆ (Pre-Tax 0.0000 0.0013 0.0689* -0.0128* -0.0071 -0.1523
Interest) (0.01) (1.03) (1.66) (-1.80) (-1.00) (-0.49)
∆ (Income 0.3829 0.3276 -2.0354 1.8716 1.7968 25.9123
to Sales) (0.52) (0.36) (-0.81) (1.52) (1.47) (1.50)
∆ (LT Debt 0.6014 0.7186 3.2870 -2.2788 -1.9567 -2.8967
to Assets) (0.91) (0.84) (1.45) (-1.37) (-0.94) (-0.22)
∆ (Debt to -1.1563 -1.6063 1.3292 1.5568 1.5662 3.6969
Capital) (-1.43) (-1.56) (0.66) (0.79) (0.76) (0.34)
∆ (Sdret) -0.1936** -0.1535 -0.3298* -0.0613 0.2952** -0.3478
(-2.35) (-1.54) (-1.76) (-0.50) (2.13) (-0.75)
∆ (T-note) 0.5761*** 0.5794*** 0.1961 1.8583*** 1.5240*** 2.5585***
(9.76) (8.39) (0.86) (7.21) (5.01) (2.67)
∆ (Term slope) 0.5430*** 0.6497*** -0.2345 2.9444*** 2.5503*** 4.5634***
(6.39) (6.48) (-0.63) (8.46) (6.47) (3.34)
∆ (Eurodollar) 0.9973*** 1.0976*** 0.6226* 2.6685*** 3.1532*** 2.0808*
(8.51) (7.77) (1.94) (5.77) (4.99) (1.87)
Constant 0.1613*** 0.2132*** 0.0505 1.0001*** 1.3306*** 1.0855
(2.68) (3.06) (0.20) (6.22) (7.57) (1.23)
Observations 1,828 1,546 282 1,064 781 283
Adj. R-sq 0.521 0.545 0.853 0.718 0.785 0.858
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Table 11: Regression Results: Asset and Financing Decompositions
Yield spread changes are regressed on variables obtained from a balance sheet decomposition of asset growth into an investment aspect and a financing aspect. The
investment decomposition defines total assets as the sum of: (1) Cash (∆Cash: Compustat #1), (2) Noncash current assets (∆CurAsst: Compustat #4 - Compustat
#1), (3) Property, plant and equipment (∆PPE: Compustat #8), (4) Investment and advances (∆IvA: Compustat #31 +Compustat #32), (5) Intangible Assets
(∆Intan: Compustat #33), and (6) Other assets (∆OthAssets: ∆Total assets- ∆Cash- ∆CurAsst- ∆PPE- ∆IVA- ∆Intan). The financing decomposition defines
total assets as the sum of: (1) Retained earnings (∆RE: Compustat #36), (2) Stock (∆Stock: Compustat #130 + Compustat #60 + Compustat #38 - Compustat
#36), (3) Debt (∆Debt: Compustat #9 + Compustat #34), Operating liabilities (∆OpLiab:∆Total liabilities- ∆Debt) and others liabilities and shareholders’ equity
((∆OthLS:∆Total assets-∆RE- ∆Stock- ∆Debt-∆OpLiab). T-statistics are presented in parentheses. *, ** or *** signifies significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1%
level, respectively.
Panel A. Full Sample
Constant ∆Cash ∆CurAsst ∆PPE ∆IvA ∆InTan ∆OthAssets ∆RE ∆Stock ∆Debt ∆OpLiab ∆OthLS
0.3096*** -1.1472*** . . . . . . . . . .
(11.15) (-3.51) . . . . . . . . . .
0.2674*** . 1.9731*** . . . . . . . . .
(16.02) . (5.17) . . . . . . . . .
0.2191*** . . 0.7723*** . . . . . . . .
(12.00) . . (3.35) . . . . . . . .
0.2300*** . . . 2.8060*** . . . . . . .
(12.12) . . . (3.89) . . . . . . .
0.2525*** . . . . 0.7028*** . . . . . .
(15.22) . . . . (3.45) . . . . . .
0.2394*** . . . . . -0.3703*** . . . . .
(13.65) . . . . . (-5.27) . . . . .
0.3475*** -0.8169** 1.4877*** 0.5225** 2.8043*** 0.1834 -0.4265*** . . . . .
(13.26) (-2.45) (3.29) (2.04) (3.87) (0.73) (-6.01) . . . . .
0.2178*** . . . . . . 0.2653 . . . .
(10.71) . . . . . . (1.15) . . . .
0.2589*** . . . . . . . 0.1440 . . .
(15.74) . . . . . . . (0.76) . . .
0.2481*** . . . . . . . . 1.4859*** . .
(13.02) . . . . . . . . (4.14) . .
0.2117*** . . . . . . . . . 1.7013*** .
(10.88) . . . . . . . . . (4.79) .
0.2639*** . . . . . . . . . . -0.3707
(14.46) . . . . . . . . . . (-0.79)
0.1870*** . . . . . . -1.0211*** 0.3068 1.7483*** 2.3519*** -1.2889*
(8.27) . . . . . . (-2.93) (1.17) (4.27) (4.56) (-1.87)
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Panel B. Positive Asset Growth Sample
Constant ∆Cash ∆CurAsst ∆PPE ∆IvA ∆InTan ∆OthAssets ∆RE ∆Stock ∆Debt ∆OpLiab ∆OthLS
0.3379*** -1.0649*** . . . . . . . . . .
(11.63) (-3.58) . . . . . . . . . .
0.2778*** . 2.1514*** . . . . . . . . .
(17.82) . (4.40) . . . . . . . . .
0.1969*** . . 0.2949* . . . . . . . .
(9.42) . . (1.81) . . . . . . . .
0.2462*** . . . 1.7576** . . . . . . .
(14.15) . . . (2.17) . . . . . . .
0.2562*** . . . . 0.3740** . . . . . .
(16.92) . . . . (2.40) . . . . . .
0.2474*** . . . . . -0.5119*** . . . . .
(15.61) . . . . . (-6.82) . . . . .
0.3876*** -0.6298** 2.2449*** -0.0516 2.0703** -0.0968 -0.5498*** . . . . .
(14.58) (-2.04) (3.92) (-0.29) (2.52) (-0.49) (-7.38) . . . . .
0.1976*** . . . . . . 0.1282 . . .
(7.32) . . . . . . (0.54) . . .
0.2233*** . . . . . . . 0.4713** . . .
(9.97) . . . . . . . (2.36) . . .
0.2629*** . . . . . . . . 0.9440** . .
(17.60) . . . . . . . . (2.51) . .
0.2547*** . . . . . . . . . 0.8684** .
(12.37) . . . . . . . . . (2.27) .
0.2849*** . . . . . . . . . . -1.3196***
(16.51) . . . . . . . . . . (-2.58)
0.2255*** . . . . . . -0.7674** 0.8055*** 1.5583*** 1.0970** -1.4196**
(10.51) . . . . . . (-2.23) (3.39) (4.13) (2.01) (-1.97)
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Panel C. Negative Asset Growth Sample
Constant ∆Cash ∆CurAsst ∆PPE ∆IvA ∆InTan ∆OthAssets ∆RE ∆Stock ∆Debt ∆OpLiab ∆OthLS
0.2077*** -6.0798*** . . . . . . . . . .
(2.77) (-5.92) . . . . . . . . . .
0.1900*** . 2.9990*** . . . . . . . . .
(3.57) . (2.81) . . . . . . . . .
0.2679*** . . 4.7555*** . . . . . . . .
(5.14) . . (3.73) . . . . . . . .
0.3177*** . . . 4.1554** . . . . . . .
(5.71) . . . (2.28) . . . . . . .
0.2489*** . . . . 4.3068*** . . . . . .
(4.75) . . . . (3.27) . . . . . .
0.3061*** . . . . 0.5354*** . . . . .
(5.82) . . . . . (2.72) . . . . .
0.1159 -4.2245*** 1.8740* 3.7219*** 3.5903* 3.3668** 0.5817*** . . . . .
(1.57) (-3.63) (1.67) (2.84) (1.93) (2.48) (2.93) . . . . .
0.3162*** . . . . . . -1.6151 . . . .
(4.43) . . . . . . (-1.19) . . . .
0.2484*** . . . . . . . -1.8055*** . . .
(4.61) . . . . . . . (-3.18) . . .
0.1925*** . . . . . . . . 0.7895 . .
(3.36) . . . . . . . . (0.89) . .
0.2013*** . . . . . . . . . 7.4112*** .
(3.26) . . . . . . . . . (4.78) .
0.2035*** . . . . . . . . . . 2.7146***
(3.59) . . . . . . . . . . (2.58)
0.3650*** . . . . . . -2.4822* -0.8878 2.0696* 8.1579*** -0.3292
(6.77) . . . . . . (-1.77) (-1.13) (1.83) (5.12) (-0.14)
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Table 12: Asset Growth and Bond Performance
We perform panel regression on the asset growth effect on bond return. In column (1) to column (4), the
dependent variable is the excess return of corporate bonds over one year treasury rate. In column (5), the
dependent variables is the yield change effect component of bond return. In column (6), the dependent
variable is the yield effect component of bond return. We control for firm characteristics: asset growth
rate, leverage, income to sales and market to book (M/B) ratio. We also control for bond characteristics:
bond ratings, years to maturity, and yield to maturity. More details on the construction of these variables
are provided in the Appendix. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. The issuer is the fixed effect. *,
** or *** signifies significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Return Return Return Return Price Change Current Yield
Asset Growth -0.0256*** -0.0274*** -0.0216*** -0.0233*** -0.0230*** -0.0002
(-3.21) (-4.00) (-2.82) (-3.41) (-3.67) (-0.19)
Leverage 0.0602** 0.0499** 0.0513** -0.0010
(2.45) (2.08) (2.40) (-0.28)
Income to Sales -0.0392* -0.0675*** -0.0564*** -0.0120***
(-1.84) (-3.68) (-3.45) (-3.63)
M/B -0.0007** -0.0005* -0.0004* -0.0000
(-2.17) (-1.70) (-1.65) (-1.55)
Rating -0.0098*** -0.0086*** -0.0068*** -0.0018***
(-6.40) (-5.59) (-5.03) (-6.48)
Maturity 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0013*** 0.0002***
(9.07) (9.12) (8.40) (8.67)
Yield -0.0087*** -0.0088*** -0.0095*** 0.0006***
(-8.84) (-8.89) (-9.12) (5.11)
Constant 0.0776*** 0.2490*** 0.0659*** 0.2303*** 0.1434*** 0.0866***
(147.95) (10.92) (6.61) (9.06) (6.35) (18.92)
Observations 19,956 19,956 19,956 19,956 19,956 19,956
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Following the 2008 financial crisis and the government bailout of troubled 
companies, Too-Big-to-Fail became a standard expression to name a free 
protection of Wall Street by tax-payers’ money. We offer a novel approach to 
estimate the value of the implicit government guarantee by combining the 
contingent claim pricing with the likelihood of the government intervention. We 
find that the cost of this implicit protection on average is about $13 million per 
company, per year, and it rises to about $24 million if the government is assumed 
to intervene with certainty. The funding costs for both small and large banks are 
negatively related to the value of the implicit government guarantee. Moreover, 
we show that the spread of the funding costs of small banks over large banks is 
strongly associated with the value of the implicit government guarantee, especially 





Too-Big-to-Fail: The Value of Implicit Government Guarantee 
 
1. Introduction 
Shedding some light on the 2008 financial crisis, Sorkin (2009) chronicles the 
story from the beginning of the crisis to the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and 
popularizes the concept of “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF). While saving the financial system, 
TARP was controversial as the cost of the bailout was mainly supported by the US tax 
payers. The idea of TBTF suggests that large companies enjoy a guarantee that they will 
be rescued by the government in a bankruptcy situation. As written by Bloomberg 
editorial board: 
“On television, in interviews and in meetings with investors, executives of the biggest 
U.S. banks -- JPMorgan Chase & Co. Chief Executive Jamie Dimon -- make the case 
that size is a competitive advantage. It helps them lower costs and vie for customers 
on an international scale. Limiting it, they warn, would impair profitability and 
weaken the country’s position in global finance. 
So what if we told you that, by our calculations, the largest U.S. banks aren’t really 
profitable at all? What if the billions of dollars they allegedly earn for their 
shareholders were almost entirely a gift from U.S. taxpayers?”1 
There is a common agreement that such an implicit guarantee exists and its cost 
may be justified due to the potential impact on the overall economy in case of the 
collapse of the financial system. At the same time, the implicit government guarantee 
                                                          
1 From of Bloomberg View’s Editorials: Why Should Taxpayers Give Big Banks $83 Billion a Year?, 




reduces investors’ perception about the risk of the financial institution and their 
expected losses. It also leads to unfair competition due to lower cost of funds, increased 
risk taking by TBTF institutions and increased potential financial burden on the 
government. Policy makers have an intention to curb the value of the implicit 
government guarantee (Schich and Aydin (2014)) which creates a need for having a 
robust way of measuring it. 
The contribution of this article is twofold. First, we propose a novel way to 
measure the value of the implicit government guarantee. Using our approach we find a 
confirmation for the above Bloomberg editorial board view that the estimate of the 
implicit government protection can go beyond billions of dollars for some of the largest 
companies. Since the implicit government guarantee may potentially involve transfer of 
billions of dollars from the government to the bailed-out companies, the ability to 
estimate it remains an important public policy concern. Second, we investigate the 
relationship between the implicit government guarantee and the funding costs of small 
and large banks. The funding costs are often used as a proxy for the TBTF effect. Strong 
association between the spread of funding costs of small banks over large banks with 
our estimate of the implicit government guarantee serves as an additional confirmation 
of the validity of our model. 
Quantifying the value of the implicit government guarantee has generated a 
considerable interest in the years following the financial crisis. The more common 
approaches of assessing the TBTF or the value of implicit government guarantee can be 
split into three groups: i) The funding cost approach; ii) The CDS-based approach; iii) 




The funding cost approach argues that the TBTF institutions enjoy lower costs 
of funds due to the implicit government guarantee. The implicit government guarantee 
is estimated as a reduction in the costs of funds that the TBTF institutions have 
compared to the costs of funds without the government guarantee. A number of papers 
(for example, Baker and McArthur (2009) and Li, Qu, and Zhang (2011)) estimate the 
reduction in the funding costs as the difference in the cost of funds of small and large 
(TBTF) financial institutions. It is assumed that only the large banks will be supported 
by the government in case of default. Several other papers (see, for example, Noss and 
Sowerbutts (2012), Ueda and di Mauro (2013), Lambert et al. (2014), and Schich, 
Bijlsma and Mocking (2014)) estimate the reduction in the funding costs based on credit 
ratings. Credit rating agencies produce two credit ratings – an “individual” credit rating 
designed to assess institution’s strength on a stand-alone basis and a “support” rating 
which incorporates the probability that the institution will receive government support. 
The reduction in the funding costs in this case is estimated as the difference in the cost 
of funds based on higher “individual” rating and actual “support” rating. The implicit 
government guarantee is then calculated by multiplying the difference in the funding 
costs by the assets of the TBTF banks. The main drawback of the first approach is that 
it doesn’t control for the relative risk of different financial institutions and doesn’t take 
into consideration the likelihood of receiving government support. The rating-based 
approach avoids these problems, it is easy to implement, and the required data is readily 
available, but it suffers from being subjective and relying on credit rating agency 




crisis of 2007-2009, credit rating agencies have been heavily criticized for producing 
inaccurate credit ratings. 
The CDS-based approach compares the difference between observed CDS 
spreads and modelled fair-value CDS spreads (FVS) calculated from the equity price 
information. Observed CDS spread is an indicator of the company’s perceived risk of 
default and it reflects the likelihood of government intervention and the size of 
government support in case of distress. The CDS-based approach usually assumes that 
equity holders are wiped out if company defaults. It implies that equity prices contain 
only information about the probability of company’s default and disregard the 
possibility of government intervention. Therefore, the FVS computed based on equity 
prices do not include the government guarantee. Several papers (see, for example, 
Schweikhard and Tsesmelidakis (2012) and Lambert et al. (2014)) use Merton (1974) 
model to estimate FVS, whereas Li, Qu, and Zhang (2011) use some proprietary model 
for this purpose. The difference between the FVS and the observed CDS spreads is then 
used as a measure of the implicit government guarantee. The biggest drawback of this 
method is data availability. The CDS data is only available for large financial 
institutions, which limits the data sample. Another potential problem with this approach 
is the underlying model assumptions used to compute FVS, including the assumption 
that equity holders are not bailed out.  
The contingent claims approach typically relies on Merton’s (1974) model. It is 
assumed that a firm has two types of claims – single homogeneous class of debt and the 
residual claim, equity. The implicit government guarantee is estimated by modeling the 




threshold (default barrier) at a future time, T. Under the Merton’s model the firm cannot 
default before time T. In case of default, the bondholders take over the firm and the 
shareholders get nothing. The value of the implicit government guarantee is computed 
as a put option on the firm’s assets with the strike price equal to the default barrier at 
some future time. It is assumed to be the sum necessary to restore the value of assets to 
the debt threshold. Most of the studies that use the contingent claims approach calculate 
the implicit government guarantee as an aggregate subsidy for all banks (see, for 
example, Noss and Somerbutts (2012), or Oxera (2011)). One potential problem related 
to this approach is the need to estimate the asset value and the asset volatility which are 
unobservable and should be inferred from the equity market information. The 
techniques used in the literature estimate the asset value and volatility by simultaneously 
solving the system of two equations with two unknowns (see, for example, Lucas and 
McDonald (2009)), some papers rely on oversimplifying assumptions (for example, 
Noss and Somerbutts (2012) and Oxera (2011) assume that equity constitutes 6% of 
total assets) or use complex and resource-intensive techniques (for example, Jobst and 
Gray (2013)). Using the contingent claim approach implicitly assumes that the 
government will intervene with certainty. However, on an individual basis, as evidence 
by the collapse of the Lehman Brothers, this intervention may fail to materialize. 
Therefore, it is necessary to take into account the likelihood of the government 
intervention for a given firm. The framework for estimating the likelihood of the 
government intervention is provided by Beliaeva, Khaksari and Tsafack (2015) who 




In this paper we combine the contingent claim approach with the likelihood of 
the government intervention to provide an appropriate and robust measure of the 
implicit government guarantee as the expected value of the contingent claim.2 This is 
simply the product of the probability of the government intervention and the value of 
the put option. We find that the cost of the government protection in our sample is, on 
average, about $24.5 million per company, per year, and it drops to $13.4 million when 
we incorporate the fact that the government may not intervene. Our estimates are also 
consistent with the Bloomberg View’s editorials, as we find that the value of the implicit 
government guarantee can go beyond billions of dollar for very large banks with trillions 
of dollar in assets and debts. The value of the implicit government guarantee sharply 
increases after the 2008 financial crisis. 
Our empirical analysis reveals a consistently inverse relationship between 
funding costs and the value of the implicit government guarantee. This inverse 
relationship means that the decrease in the funding costs is associated with an increase 
in the value of the government guarantee for both large and small companies. 
Furthermore, we find that the spread in funding costs of small banks over large banks 
and the implicit government guarantee are positively related. In fact, the increase in the 
difference between the funding costs of small banks and large banks is often considered 
as a proxy for the too-big-to-fail premium. Therefore, the positive relationship confirms 
this intuition and reinforces our confidence in the way we estimate the value of the 
implicit government guarantee. Investigating potential structural break for the period 
                                                          
2 To compute the contingent claim value, we derive an easily implementable solution for the asset value 
and asset volatility, which involves solving only one equation with one unknown instead of solving a 




after the crisis mostly confirms our results. The relationship between the funding cost 
spread and the implicit government guarantee is strong and positive both before and 
after the crisis for bank holding company data. For the FDIC data the results are only 
strong and positive after the crisis. Before the crisis the relationship is inverse which 
can be attributed to the FDIC insurance effect. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our 
methodology and the data set used to estimate the implicit government guarantee. 
Section 3 describes the methodology, the data, and the variables used for analyzing the 
relationship between our measures of the implicit government guarantee and funding 
costs. Section 4 presents and summarizes our empirical findings, and section 5 
concludes. 
2. Estimation of the Value of the Implicit Government Guarantee 
2.1. Definition   
We define the value of the implicit government guarantee as the expected value 
of the government intervention to rescue the distressed firm. The value of the implicit 
government guarantee for company 𝑖 is computed as: 
𝐸𝑣𝑔,𝑖 = 𝜋𝑖 × 𝑣𝑔,𝑖 
Where, 𝜋𝑖, –  the probability of the government intervention for company 𝑖; 
𝑣𝑔,𝑖 –  the value of the government subsidy given that intervention will happen 
with certainty for company 𝑖. 
2.2. Estimating the Probability of the Government Intervention (πi):  
Following Beliaeva, Khaksari and Tsafack (2015), we use a logit model to 




distress. In our logit model we use the finance industry indicator, the firm size, and the 
interaction term between these two variables as explanatory variables. The logit model 
provides a simple way to describe the relationship between several explanatory 
variables and a binary dependent variable.  We apply our model to an extensive dataset 
of 1571 bankrupt and bailed out companies between 2000 and 2015. The dependent 
variable in the logit model estimates the probability that the government will step in and 
rescue a company in distress. It is defined as follows: 
𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑖𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑔𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
 0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒                                              
 
The logit model is then specified as follows:  
𝑃(𝐵𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑖) = 𝐹(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑢𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑛 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑛 ) 
Where, F( ∙ )  –  the logit function; 
lgasset,  –  the natural logarithm of the total assets; 
𝐷𝑢𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑛, –  the dummy variable indicating whether the company 
belongs to the finance industry or not; 
𝑙𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑛 – the interaction term between the log of the total assets and 
the finance industry membership. 
2.3. The Government Guarantee Data and Results 
The data that we use to estimate the implicit government guarantee comes from 
several major sources: SDC Platinum database, TARP database and ProPublica 
website. SDC Platinum database includes all US public companies with $10 million 
or more in assets that file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. We compile a broad 
sample of Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings spanning the years 2000 through 2015 (SDC 




The list of bailout firms is obtained from the ProPublica’s website and the TARP 
database.  
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the number of bailout and bankrupt firms in 
our sample. We have a total of 1,247 bankruptcy cases, including 175 finance firms, 
and 324 bailout firms, including 304 finance firms. Panel B of Table 1 provides 
summary statistics for the variables used in the estimation of the probability of the 
government intervention. The average of the total assets is $12 billion. We normalize 
the total assets by taking the natural logarithm of the total assets (lgasset hereafter). 
The average of lgasset is 6.79 with the standard deviation of 1.53. Panel C of Table 1 
shows the correlation coefficients among these variables. We observe a 0.685 
correlation between the finance industry dummy variable and the bailout dummy 
variable and 0.36 correlation between the log of total assets and the bailout dummy 
variable.  
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
We analyze four different model specifications of logit regression. In model 1 
and model 2 we estimate the effects of the financial industry (finance dummy) and the 
firm size (log of total assets) on the probability of the government intervention, 
respectively. We include both variables in model 3. To examine the interaction effect, 
in model 4 we include an additional interaction variable between the finance industry 
dummy and the log of the total assets. The results of the logit regression estimation for 
four model specifications are presented in Table 2. All of the parameter estimates are 




membership are the two main factors explaining the probability of the government 
intervention, the addition of the interaction variable between the firm size and the 
finance industry dummy increases the explanatory power of the model. In fact, model 4 
is the best fitting model out of the four model specifications as evidenced by the lowest 
AIC criteria of 733.67 and the highest Pseudo R2 of 64.03%. Therefore, we choose 
Model 4 specification to estimate the probability of the government intervention for all 
firms in our full sample.3 The negative sign for the coefficient of the interaction variable 
seems counterintuitive as the TBTF is mostly related to the financial institutions. A 
straightforward interpretation of the negative sign is that while the size matters for a 
bailout of any firm, it is more important for non-finance firms relative to finance firms. 
This result can be justified by the fact that there is a strong correlation between credit 
risks of large and small banks. This is especially true for our sample. The TARP 
program for the bailout of the financial system included both very large banks as well 
as small banks. In contrast, non-finance companies’ bailout had more homogeneity: 
firms rescued in 2001 were mostly big airline companies. Therefore, while the firm size 
matters for a bailout decision, within the financial system, the size effect for individual 
financial institutions is overshadowed by the risk of the contagion effect. Due to this, 
the firm’s size is not the main driving factor of the bailout decision within the financial 
industry.  
It also worth noticing that our estimation procedure does not include a dummy 
variable for the crisis period. Although the bailout is related to the economic 
environment, including a variable indicator for the crisis period will introduce some 
                                                          
3 Note that the data sample used to estimate the probability of the government intervention involved 




endogeneity in the estimation of the likelihood of the government intervention for a 
given company. In fact, when TBTF companies are in trouble, it tends to trigger both a 
crisis and a bailout program. This can be seen in our sample as we have bailouts only 
during the crisis period, which can give a false impression that a bailout cannot occur 
without a crisis. In our study we are more interested in the probability of the government 
intervention for a given firm, even if the company is far from a distress situation. We 
expect the crisis effect to be captured by the value of the contingent claim. 
Using the estimated parameters, we fit the data to the following Logistic 
function: 
𝜋𝑖 =
exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑢𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑛 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑛 )
1 + exp(𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑢𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑛 + 𝛽3𝑙𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝐹𝑖𝑛 )
 
The above equation is used at a company level to derive the likelihood of the 
government intervention which is then incorporated into the calculation of the value of 
the implicit government guarantee.  
2.4. Estimating the Value of the Government Subsidy Given Intervention (Vi) 
We estimate the value of the government subsidy given that intervention will 
happen with certainty (i.e. assuming the “full coverage” by the government) using the 
contingent claims approach of Merton (1974). Under this approach it is assumed that 
the firm has a simple capital structure consisting of equity and a single homogeneous 
class of debt. The firm’s equity value is modelled as a call option on the firm’s assets 
with the exercise price equal to the firm’s default barrier (firm’s liabilities).4 If at the 
option’s maturity the asset value is less than the strike price, then the option expires 
                                                          




worthless, shareholders get nothing and the firm is turned over to the debtholders. The 
value of the implicit government guarantee is analogous to a put option on the firm’s 
assets with the strike price equal to the default barrier (firm’s liabilities). If at option’s 
maturity the asset value is less than the strike price, then the option is in-the-money and 
the option payoff (i.e. payoff from the government) is equal to the difference between 
the strike price (the firm’s liabilities) and the firm’s assets. It is represented as a claim 
that firms have on the government contingent on their failure, the exercising of which 
restores their assets to a value necessary to prevent their default. The estimation of the 
value of the government subsidy is done in two steps: 
Step 1. Estimate 𝑉𝐴 (the value of assets) and 𝜎𝐴 (the volatility of assets) by solving a 
system of two equations based on Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton 
(1974).  
  Equation 1: The value of equity expressed as a call option on the firm’s assets: 
𝑉𝐸 = 𝑉𝐴 × 𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝐿 × 𝑒













𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝜎𝐴√𝜏 
Where, 𝑉𝐴 – the value of assets, 
  𝜎𝐴 – the volatility of assets, 
  𝑉𝐸 – the value of equity, 




L – the firm’s existing liabilities (senior debt, subordinated debt, 
preferred equity). 





× 𝑉𝐴 × 𝑁(𝑑1) 
Given the equity volatility data, the risk-free rate, the market value of equity, 
and the face value of debt, it is necessary to solve the system of these two 
highly non-linear equations to estimate the value of assets and the volatility of 
assets. We derive an easily implementable solution for the assets value and 
assets volatility which involves solving only one equation with one unknown. 
Technical details on the estimation procedure are provided in Appendix A.  
Step 2. Compute the value of the implicit government guarantee given intervention as 
a put option on the firm’s assets with the strike price equal to the default 
barrier (the firm’s liabilities). 
𝑣𝑖 = 𝐿 × 𝑒
−𝑟𝑓𝜏 × 𝑁(−𝑑2) − 𝑉𝐴 × 𝑁(−𝑑1) 
For a given company i, this represents the value of the government guarantee 
given that the intervention will happen with certainty.  
3. Government Guarantee and the Funding Costs 
3.1. The Model Specification 
It is often assumed that only large financial institutions will be supported by the 
government in case of default5. Therefore, the difference in the costs of funds between 
                                                          
5 This is the premises of the funding cost approach (see, for example, Baker and McArthur (2009) and 




small and large financial institutions can be thought of as a proxy for the implicit 
government guarantee. In this section we investigate the relationship between our 
measure of the value of the implicit government guarantee, 𝐸𝑣𝑔, and the funding cost 
variable while also controlling for the GDP growth rate. We use the following model 
specification: 
𝐸𝑣𝑔 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽 × 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾 × 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 
To investigate the potential change in the relationship between of the value of 
the implicit government guarantee and the funding cost, we introduce an interaction 
variable between the funding cost and the crisis indicator as follows. 
𝐸𝑣𝑔 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽 × 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛿 × 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 × 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾 ×
𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ, 
Where, 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 – a dummy variable taking a value of one after the crisis and zero 
otherwise. 
To study the relationship between the value of the implicit government 
guarantee and the funding cost variable, we sort our data sample into two groups by 
bank size. Following Li, Qu, and Zhang (2011), we define the top 20 in book assets as 
of December of each year as large banks and the remainder as small banks. We 
separately analyze the relationship between the implicit government guarantee and the 
funding costs of large banks, small banks and the difference in the funding costs of small 
and large banks. 
The analysis of the relationship between the implicit government guarantee and 





3.2. Funding Cost Measure 
The bank’s funding cost, i.e. the interest rate charged by the bank’s creditors, 
depends on the lender’s perception of the bank’s probability of distress. In other words, 
the lenders assess the bank’s default probability and adjust the interest rate they charge 
accordingly. There are two ways to obtain data on interest rates and default probabilities 
for any given bank. 
First, interest rates and default probabilities can be extracted from the market 
data. A popular proxy for the bank’s funding cost is a CDS spread, which can also be 
used to imply the bank’s default probability. However, the limitation of this approach 
is that the CDS data is not widely available for small banks. An alternative source of 
data on the bank’s funding cost and default probability is the bank’s balance sheet 
reports. The data on the bank’s interest expense on debt allows to construct proxies of 
funding costs. Baker and McArthur (2009) use the FDIC data for depository institutions 
to compare the average cost of funds for large banks against small banks. Since the 
FDIC data is at the depository firm level, this analysis does not cover the consolidated 
bank holding company level where additional funding costs may arise. In addition to 
using funding costs incurred by depository institutions as reported by the FDIC, we 
construct funding costs using banks’ corporate level balance sheet data from 
COMPUSTAT Bank database.  
Following Araten and Turner (2013), we use the cost of deposit as a measure of 
funding cost. It is defined as a ratio of the total interest expense on interest bearing 





𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑛 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 
The funding cost measure is computed on a quarterly basis. The interest expense 
on interest bearing liabilities (i.e. interest bearing debt) includes interest paid on 
certificates of deposit, savings certificates, saving deposits and time deposits. The 
average total liabilities are computed as the average of the ending total liabilities of 
quarter t and the average of the ending total liabilities of quarter t-4. 
Existing literature has examined alternative measures of funding costs, such as 
the average funding cost and the interbank funding cost (see, for example, Araten and 
Turner (2013) and Aymanns, Caceres, Daniel and Schumacher (2016)). However, these 
two measures may not be appropriate for our study. The average funding cost measure 
includes payments made to all of the bank’s creditors, including both retail and 
wholesale depositors. As noted by Araten and Turner (2013), the composition of the 
average funding cost is different for large and small banks, in which large banks have 
various sources of funds, while small banks largely rely on regular deposits. As a result, 
the average funding cost of large banks tends to be upward biased due to the mix of 
funding cost.  The interbank funding cost measure is calculated as a ratio of interest 
expense on federal funds and repos purchased to the average total federal funds and 
repos purchased during the reporting period. The large banks are more likely to use 
federal funds and repos for short-term borrowing, while small banks have limited access 
to them. In fact, the cost of federal funds makes up only 6% of the overall funding costs 
of small banks as reported by Araten and Turner (2013). Due to the shortcomings of the 





3.3. Bank Funding Cost Data 
The banking data is obtained from the COMPUSTAT Bank database and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The COMPUSTAT Bank database 
contains data on all publicly listed US banks and consolidates bank data at bank 
holding company level. There are 1,440 US listed banks from 2000 to 2015. The FDIC 
dataset contains approximately 10,000 US depository institutions over a period of 16 
years ranging from 2000 to 2015. Our data sample is constrained by data availability. 
For example, if the data is missing for a bank in a specific quarter, we exclude that 
observation from our data sample. Our final sample consists of 106 listed banks from 
Compustat and 10,638 depository institutions from FDIC. 
[Insert Figure  Here] 
To conduct a funding cost analysis of large and small banks over the 2000 to 
2015 period, we define large or TBTF banks as the top 20 banks in book assets for 
each period.6 Figure  compares the funding cost differences between small and large 
banks before, during and after the crisis period. Using the NBER business cycle data, 
the pre-recession period is defined as the one year period before the peak of the 
recession and the post-recession period is defined as the one year period after the 
trough of the recession. The recession period starts at the peak of the recession and 
ends at the trough. The funding cost is calculated as the average of the yearly medians 
of annualized quarterly funding costs during the designated period. As shown in 
Figure , the funding cost difference between small BHCs and large BHCs is -30 bps 
                                                          
6 We also look at an alternative definition of large banks: for a given quarter large banks are defined as 





during the pre-crisis period. The funding cost gap increases by 24 bps from -30 bps to 
-6 bps during the crisis period, suggesting that due to the implicit government 
guarantee the funding cost for large BHCs decreased more compared to that of the 
small BHCs. Moreover, large BHCs have an 8 bps funding cost advantage over small 
BHCs during the one year post crisis period implying that large BHCs continued 
enjoying the implicit government guarantee after the crisis. Figure 2.1 shows that the 
funding cost advantages of the large banks continues for 2 years after the trough of 
the crisis and then it gradually narrows down.   
[Insert Figure 2.1 Here] 
For the FDIC banks the funding cost advantage for large banks is even stronger. 
As Figure  shows, the funding cost difference between small and large banks is -11 
bps during the pre-crisis period, it increases to 55 bps during the crisis period, and to 
89 bps during the one year post crisis period. Figure 2.2 shows that the funding cost 
advantages of the large banks over the small banks is still big (79 bps) two years after 
the crisis. Our findings provide strong evidence that the large banks enjoy funding 
cost benefits associated with the TBTF status. 
[Insert Figure 2.2 Here] 
An important point we want to address here is the FDIC insurance effect on the 
funding cost. The FDIC insurance protects the funds depositors place in banks and 
saving associations against the losses associated with the failure of the FDIC insured 
institution. FDIC deposit insurance is backed by the full faith and credit of the United 
States government. The standard deposit insurance amount is $250,000 per depositor, 




FDIC pays insurance to depositors up to the insurance limit. Funding cost is the interest 
rate charged by the bank’s creditors, reflecting lender’s perception of the bank’s 
creditworthiness. Thus, the FDIC insurance can potentially lower the funding costs for 
FDIC insured institutions. The effect should be stronger for small banks because small 
banks are more likely to attract deposits from ordinary depositors with the deposit 
amount below the insurance limit while large banks have a large variety of clients with 
the large variation in deposit amounts. Our finding show that before the crisis small 
FDIC banks had lower funding costs compared to the large banks which could be 
partially attributed to the FDIC insurance effect. However, this relationship reversed 
during and after the crisis. While funding costs decreased for both small and large FDIC 
banks, the reduction was much bigger for the large FDIC banks resulting in significantly 
lower costs of funds for the large banks compared to the small banks. This suggests that 
during and after the crisis the FDIC insurance effect is not significant and it is 
overpowered by the increase in the value of the implicit government guarantee. 
3.4. Summary statistics 
We provide below the summary statistics for the value of the contingent claim, 
the expected value of the implicit government guarantee, the leverage, and the funding 
cost. 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
Panel A provides the descriptive statistics of variables for government guarantee 
estimation. Panel B and Panel C provide summary statistics of banks’ fundamental and 
funding cost variable from 2000 to 2015 for BHCs and FDIC banks, respectively. Bank 




our sample of banks, the mean (median) of total assets is $129.74 (27.07) billion for 
BHCs and $1.45 (0.13) billion for FDIC banks, while the mean (median) of total 
liabilities is $117.36 (24.12) billion for BHCs and $1.30 (0.12) billion for FDIC banks. 
For BHCs, the funding cost ranges from 0.02% to 10.49% with the mean (median) of 
2.05% (1.76%). For FDIC banks, the funding cost ranges from 0.07% to 8.48% with the 
mean (median) of 2.38% (2.19).  
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
Table 4 shows the summary statistics of time-series variables used for regression 
analysis. Panel A shows the results for government guarantee related variables. Panel B 
and Panel C provide summary statistics of the time series funding cost, size and leverage 
variables separately for large banks, small banks, and for the difference between small 
and large banks from 2000 to 2015 for BHCs and FDIC banks, respectively. The mean 
size of large BHCs is 11 times bigger than that of the small ones ($171.4 billion versus 
$15.5 billion). The mean leverage of the large banks is about 18.8%, which is 4.5% 
higher than that of the small banks. The mean funding cost of large BHCs is 1.71% 
which is about 0.03% higher than that of the small BHCs. At the same time, the mean 
size of large FDIC banks is over 1000 time bigger than the size of the small FDIC banks 
($150.3 billion versus $0.14 billion). The mean funding cost of large FDIC banks 
(1.68%) is on par with the mean funding cost of large BHCs, however, the funding cost 
of small FDIC banks is 2.1% which is 0.42% above that of the large FDIC banks.  This 
difference in the funding costs between small BHCs and small FDIC banks can be 
explained by the fact that the mean size of banks in the small FDIC bank sample is over 




4. Empirical Analysis 
In this section we report the results of our empirical analysis. First, we compute 
the value of the implicit government guarantee using the two- step procedure outlined 
in section 2. Then, we relate the value of the government guarantee to funding costs of 
large banks, small banks, and the funding cost spread between small and large banks 
while controlling for the macroeconomic conditions. 
4.1. The Value of the Implicit Government Guarantee 
Using the firms’ equity and liability data at the beginning of the quarter,7 we 
estimate the value of the government subsidy given intervention as a put option on the 
firm’s assets with the strike price equal to the default barrier (firm’s liabilities).8 Panel 
A of Table 3 shows that the average value of the implicit contingent claim over a one 
year maturity is $23.68 million, with the maximum of $111.2 billion. This value 
represents the value of the government guarantee under the assumption that the 
guarantee is explicit, i.e. that the government will rescue the troubled companies with 
certainty. In practice, as the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy has shown, this is not the case 
even for large banks. One of the contributions of our study is that we define the value 
of the implicit government guarantee as an expected value of the government 
intervention and we estimate it by multiplying the value of the government subsidy 
given certain intervention by the probability of the government intervention. We 
estimate the average probability of the government intervention to be 15%. We also find 
                                                          
7 For the volatility of the equity, we use the EWMA filter to estimate from quarter to quarter, starting with 
the volatility estimated on the entire series for each company. We also look at an alternative definition 
using daily stock returns over the past 12 months. We find that the results are very similar. 
8 Following Levine and Wu (2016) and Vassalou and Xing (2004), we use one year as the time to maturity 




that large firms and financial institutions are more likely to receive government support, 
while a large number of small firms may not be bailed out by the government. After 
taking into account the probability of the government intervention, we find that the 
average expected value of the implicit government guarantee for all firms is $12.91 
million but it can be as high as $89.2 billion for certain companies. This can be 
interpreted as the average annual cost of the Too Big to Fail per company for the tax 
payers. According to the TARP, the total government disbursement was $623 billion. 
Specifically, the top recipients were Fannie Mae ($116 billion), Freddie Mac ($71 
billion), AIG ($67 billion), GM ($50 billion), and the Bank of America ($50 billion). 
Therefore, our measure of the value of implicit government guarantee can well capture 
the size of the recent government bailout. 
In addition, we take the quarterly mean of the estimated government guarantee 
variables to get the time-series data for the subsequent analysis. Panel A of Table 4 
shows that the value of the contingent claim over a one year maturity ranges from about 
$376,000 to $87 million, with a $24.5 million on average. The probability of the 
government bailout ranges from 4.53% to 17.73% with an average of 15.32%. The mean 
(median) of the expected value of the implicit government guarantee for all firms over 
the sample period is $13.38 ($4.07) million. Also note that the product of the average 
probability with the contingent claim ($24.5 x 0.1532 = $3.75 million) is much smaller 
than the average value of the government guarantee ($13.38 million). This can be 
explained by the fact that big companies with large values of contingent claims also 
have higher likelihood of the government intervention. 




Figure 3 plots the evolution of the value of the implicit government guarantee 
and LIBOR interest rate from 2000 to 2015. The value of the implicit government 
guarantee was quite low before the financial crisis and it dropped virtually to zero in the 
end of 2008, following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. To deal with the financial 
crisis the Federal Reserve pushed interest rates to their historical minimum and kept 
them at that level through 2015. After the financial crisis, the value of the implicit 
government guarantee increased significantly, reaching its peak in the middle of 2011, 
but it has declined in the following years. The high level of the implicit government 
guarantee after the financial crisis coupled with the low interest rates reflects the fact 
that the government continued stabilizing the economy well after the financial crisis was 
over. While the goal was to restore confidence in the economy and stability of the 
financial system, such policy came at a cost. It put a fiscal strain on the economy, 
reduced the GDP and delayed the economic recovery. 
[Insert Figure 4 Here] 
Figure 4 shows that the value of the implicit government guarantee increased 
drastically with the crisis for both finance and non-finance companies. Since non-
finance companies have larger average size compared to finance companies ($2.7 billion 
versus $1.6 billion), the average value of the implicit government guarantee for non-
finance companies before the crisis was slightly larger compared to that of the finance 
companies ($3.1 million versus $2.3 million). After the crisis the situation reversed and 
the finance companies enjoyed a much larger average implicit government guarantee 
($31.6 million) compared to that of the non-finance companies ($24.4 million). When 




companies’ average market value, the finance companies had larger ratios both before 
and after the crisis. The difference in ratios between finance and non-finance companies 
is more pronounced after the crisis. This is consistent with the financial sector bailout 
which was done in order to prevent the collapse of the entire economy.  
4.2. The Relationship between the Value of the Implicit Government Guarantee 
and the Funding Costs 
The spread between the funding costs of the small and large banks is often used 
as a proxy for the too-big-to-fail effect of the implicit government guarantee (see, for 
example, Baker and McArthur (2009) and Li, Qu, Zhang (2011)). The intuition behind 
it is that the decrease in the funding costs of large and small banks and subsequent 
increase in the funding costs spread can be associated with an increase in the value of 
the implicit government guarantee. We investigate this relationship for the costs of 
funds using data at BHC level from Compustat (Table 5 and Table 6) and at depositary 
level from FDIC (Table 7 and Table 8).  
The value of the implicit government guarantee depends on the current 
economic conditions. To control for the state of the economy we use the GDP growth 
rate. Empirical evidence shows strong inverse relationship between the implicit 
government guarantee and the funding costs (see Table 5 and Table 7). There is a 
significant consistency in our results. The strong negative relationship holds for large 
and small companies for both BHC and FDIC funding costs measures. The inverse 
relationship means that a decrease in the funding costs is associated with an increase in 
the value of the implicit government guarantee for both large and small companies.  




In Table 5, the one percent decrease of funding cost of large banks is associated 
with $744,023 increase of the value of implicit government guarantee using the BHCs 
data. While this result is secondary and can be influenced by other factors, the most 
interesting result is the positive relationship between the spread in funding costs of small 
banks over large banks and the implicit government guarantee. 
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
Table 6 shows the one percentage increase of funding cost spread is associated 
with the $5.44 million increase of the implicit government guarantee. Since the spread 
between the funding costs of the small and large banks is often considered as a proxy 
for the too-big-to-fail premium, the positive relationship confirms this intuition and 
reinforces our confidence in the way we estimate the value of the implicit government 
guarantee. 
[Insert Table 7 Here] 
We also observe a strong positive relationship between the banks’ size and the 
implicit government guarantee for both small and large BHCs and FDIC banks. The 
positive relationship implies that larger companies enjoy higher implicit government 
guarantee. Finally, we explore the relationship between banks’ leverage level and the 
implicit government guarantee for BHCs. We find strong inverse relationship for both 
large and small BHCs meaning that highly leveraged banks tend to have lower implicit 
government guarantee. After the financial crisis many companies reduced the amount 
of leverage which increased their implicit government guarantee. 




Government Guarantee and the Funding Costs 
In this section we explore the effect of the financial crisis on the relationship 
between the value of the implicit government guarantee and the funding cost spread 
between small and large banks. To explore this relationship we add a structural break to 
distinguish between before and after the crisis periods. The empirical results, for the 
most part, are consistent with our prior findings (see Table 6 and Table 8). For BHCs 
the relationship remains strong and positive both before and after the crisis. Before the 
crisis, the funding cost spread was increasing and so did the implicit government 
guarantee. After the crisis there is usually a reversal adjustment as the markets gradually 
return to normal. The positive after the crisis relationship implies that as the funding 
cost spread narrowed, the implicit government guarantee decreased. For the FDIC banks 
the relationship is strong and positive after the crisis but it is negative before the crisis. 
This result can be attributed to the FDIC insurance effect which reduces the cost of 
funds of the FDIC insured financial institutions. As was discussed earlier, the FDIC 
insurance effect should be stronger for small FDIC banks leading to a decrease in the 
funding cost spread between small and large banks before the crisis at the time when 
the implicit government guarantee was growing. The FDIC insurance effect becomes 
insignificant during and after the crisis which is confirmed by the positive relationship 
between the value of the government guarantee and the funding cost spread after the 
crisis. 
4.4. Robustness Check 
We perform the robustness check of our results by considering an alternative 




quarter, we use Baker and McArthur (2009) definition, who define large banks as banks 
with more than $100 billion in total assets and small banks as banks with less than $100 
billion in assets. For BHCs we have 7 to 16 large banks over the sample period; for 
FDIC banks there are 8 to 24 large banks. The samples are similar to the previous 
definition, but with smaller number of banks in early 2000s and more banks in recent 
years. This makes sense because there is an overall increase in the size of banks over 
the sample period. We repeat the regression analysis as specified in the previous section, 
but compute the funding cost variables based on the alternative definition. To save the 
space, the empirical results are reported in the online appendix. 
The results of regressions with the alternative definition of large banks are very 
consistent with the results obtained with the original definition. They confirm a strong 
inverse relationship between funding costs and the implicit government guarantee for 
large and small banks for both BHCs and FDIC banks. They also confirm a strong 
positive relationship between the funding costs spreads of small banks over large banks 
and the implicit government guarantee once again supporting the TBTF effect. The 
introduction of the structural break to differentiate between before and after the crisis 
periods, has a similar effect on the signs of the coefficients as the original definition of 
the large banks but the resulting coefficients are less significant. Overall, the regressions 
with the alternative definition of the large banks strongly support and confirm our 






The contribution of our paper is twofold. First, we provide a robust way to 
estimate the value of the implicit government guarantee and, second, we investigate the 
link between the value of the implicit government guarantee and the funding cost spread 
between small and large banks. 
Combining the contingent claim pricing with the likelihood of the government 
intervention, we estimate the value of a potential bailout enjoyed by the firms. Our 
estimates support the Bloomberg View’s editorials, as we find that the value of the 
implicit government guarantee can go beyond billions of dollar for very big banks with 
trillions of dollars in assets and debts. Furthermore, we find that the value of the implicit 
government guarantee sharply increased after the 2008 financial crisis. 
Since the TBTF dynamics is often approximated by the change in the spread of 
the funding cost of small banks relative to large banks, we assess that by constructing 
the time-series of funding costs of large and small banks. We find that the funding cost 
spread is strongly related to our estimate of the value of the implicit government 
guarantee. When we introduce a structural break in the relationship, we find that the 
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Appendix A. Solving for the Value of Assets, 𝑽𝑨, and the Volatility of Assets, 𝝈𝑨 
The value of assets, 𝑉𝐴, and the volatility of assets, 𝜎𝐴, are obtained from the following 





 𝑉𝐸 = 𝑉𝐴 × 𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝐿 × 𝑒




× 𝑉𝐴 ×𝑁(𝑑1)                                                                                     (2)
 
Combining equations (1) and (2) leads to 
𝑉𝐸 = 𝑉𝐸 ×
𝜎𝐸
𝜎𝐴
− 𝐿 × 𝑒−𝑟𝑓𝜏 ×𝑁(𝑑2) 








]                                                                                     (3) 
On another hand, 𝑑2 is given by  
𝑑2 = 𝑑1 − 𝜎𝐴√𝜏 =
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑉𝐴





− 𝜎𝐴√𝜏                                     (4) 
Equating these two expressions [(3) and (4)] of 𝑑2 and solving for 𝑉𝐴 leads to  












2) 𝜏]                 (5) 
This expression shows that the value of assets can be written as a function of the 
volatility of assets 
𝑉𝐴 = ℎ(𝜎𝐴) 
On the other hand, we can use this relation in the expression of 𝑑1 to write 
𝑑1 = 𝑑1(𝜎𝐴) 
And it follows from equation (2) that  




Given the data on the market value of equity, 𝑉𝐸 , the book value of debt, L, equity 
volatility, 𝜎𝐸, and risk-free rate, 𝑟𝑓, we use equation (6) to solve for assets volatility, 𝜎𝐴. 
Once the value of 𝜎𝐴 is obtained, we use equation (5) to back out the value of assets, 𝑉𝐴. 
Following Levine and Wu (2016) and Vassalou and Xing (2004), we assume an 
estimation window of one year, i.e. 𝜏 = 1, and estimate the face value of debt as the 
sum of debt due within the next year and one half of the long term debt. The risk-free 
rate is given by the one-year Libor rate obtained from Bloomberg. 𝜎𝐸 is estimated using 
the EWMA filter to estimate from quarter to quarter, starting with the volatility 





Appendix B. Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
𝑣𝑔  Value of the contingent claim (put option) 
𝜋𝑖 Probability of the government bailout 
𝐸𝑣𝑔 
Value of the implicit government guarantee (expected value of the 
put option) 
Dum_Bailout 
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is bailed out, and 0 
if not 
Dum_Finance 
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 for finance firms, and 0 for 
non-finance firms 
Lgasset The natural logarithm of the total assets of the firm 
FCostLarge Funding costs for large banks 
FCostSmall Funding costs for small banks 
FCostDiff 
Difference between funding costs of small and large banks (Small – 
Large) 
SizeLarge Size (average asset value) of large banks 
SizeSmall Size (average asset value) of small banks 
SizeDiff  Difference in size (average asset value: Large – Small) 
LevLarge Average leverage for large banks 
LevSmall Average leverage for small banks 
LevDiff 
Difference in average leverage of small and large banks (Small – 
Large) 
AfterCrisis 
Dummy variable taking the value of 1 after the crisis, and 0 
otherwise 





Table 1: Summary Statistics for Bailed Out and Bankrupt Firms 




 Finance  Total 
  
Bankrupt  1072  175  1247   
Row Pct  85.97%  14.03%     
Col Pct  98.17%  36.53%  79.38%   
         
Bailout  20  304  324   
Row Pct  6.17%  93.83%     
Col Pct   1.83%   63.47%   20.62%    
Total   1092   479   1571   
  69.51%   30.49%      
         
Panel B. Summary statistics for variables used in the estimation of the government guarantee 
Variable  N  Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dum_Bailout  1571  0.206  0.405 0 1 





 103,75 32.5 2,100,385 
lgasset   1545   6.79   1.529 3.481 14.558 
         
Panel C. Correlation coefficients   




Dum_Bailout  1       
Dum_Finance  0.6854***  1     
lgasset   0.36***   0.397***   1   
Note: Dum_Bailout is the dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is bailed out, and 0 
otherwise. Dum_Finance is the dummy variable taking the value of 1 for finance firms, and 0 
for non-finance firms. Lgasset is the natural logarithm of the total assets of the firm.  *** 





Table 2: Logit Regression for the Probability of the Government Intervention 
This table shows parameter estimates of the logit regression of the probability of the 
government intervention. The sample includes 1571 bankrupt and bailed out companies 
between 2000 and 2015. Dum_finance indicates whether or not the firm belongs to the finance 
industry. lgasset is the natural log of the total assets. 
Variables    Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Dum_Finance  4.534***    4.676***  9.101*** 
  [0.245]    [0.299]  [1.438] 
lgasset  
 
 0.546***  0.214***  0.766*** 
    [0.0449]  [0.056]  [0.170] 
lgasset*Dum_Finance  
 
     -0.606*** 
        [0.179] 
Constant  -3.982***  -5.307***  -5.814***  -9.833*** 
    [0.226]  [0.335]  [0.471]  [1.370] 
AIC  832.494  1342.16  742.288  733.667 
Pseudo R2  0.607  0.173  0.634  0.640 
Observations   1571  1545  1545  1545 






Table 3: Summary Statistics of Company Level Data and Funding Cost Variables 
 This table provides summary statistics for listed firms, BHCs, and FDIC banks. Vg is the value 
of the contingent claim. 𝜋𝑖 is the probability of the government bailout. Evg is the expected 
value of the implicit government guarantee. Leverage is the ratio of the total debt to the total 
assets. Funding cost is the ratio of the total interest expenses to the average total interest bearing 
liabilities. Market value, total assets, total liabilities, Vg and Evg are in million. Panel A presents 
the descriptive statistics of firms’ fundamentals and estimated government guarantee variables. 
Panel B presents the descriptive statistics of fundamentals and funding cost variable for BHCs. 
Panel C presents the descriptive statistics of fundamentals and funding cost variable for FDIC 
banks. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Variables for Government Guarantee Estimated  
 Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Market Value   307,464 2,829 280 13,926 2.2 723,725 
Total asset  307,464 11,347 554 94,336 10 3,879,170 
Total liabilities  307,116 9,279 286 87,986 5.3 3,672,760 
Vg  147,078 23.68 0 864.87 0 111,220 
𝜋𝑖 307,464 0.15 0.01 0.25 0 0.84 
Evg 147,075 12.91 0 667.2 0 89,200 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of BHC Level Data 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Total asset  3450 129,744 27,067 349,629 28.8 2,577,148 
Total debt  3450 29,986 4,002 95,863 0.7 873,301 
Total liabilities  3450 117,363 24,122 316,495 27.5 2,341,284 
Leverage 3450 17.12% 16.67% 8.38% 0.26% 51.15% 
Funding Cost 3450 2.05% 1.76% 1.54% 0.02% 10.49% 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics of FDIC Depository Level Data. 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Total asset  523,063 1,446 129 26,760 0.1 2,096,114 
Total liabilities  523,063 1,295 115 24,183 0 1,905,556 







Table 4: Summary Statistics of Time-Series Variables 
This tables provides summary statistics of time-series aggregate variables constructed for 
regression analysis. The number in each cell reports the average of quarterly means. Panel A 
presents the descriptive statistics of time-series government guarantee variables. Panel B 
presents the descriptive statistics of time-series variables for BHCs. Panel C presents the 
descriptive statistics of time-series variables for FDIC banks.  
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Time-Series Variables for Government Guarantee Estimates 
 Variable Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
Vg ($million) 24.518 11.793 20.420 0.376 86.968 
𝜋𝑖  0.153 0.155 0.017 0.045 0.177 
Evg ($million) 13.376 4.065 14.769 0.0005 62.984 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Time-Series (BHC Level) 
 Variable Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
FCostLarge 1.71% 1.49% 1.36% 0.21% 4.76% 
FCostSmall 1.68% 1.50% 1.26% 0.21% 4.57% 
FCostDiff -0.03% 0.01% 0.16% -0.33% 0.25% 
SizeLarge ($ billion) 171.38  144.40  85.09  84.07  376.14  
SizeSmall ($ billion) 15.46  13.95  4.95  9.49  26.96  
SizeDiff ($ billion) 155.92  130.03  80.59  73.88  349.18  
LevLarge 18.78% 20.65% 4.99% 10.31% 26.20% 
LevSmall 14.33% 16.39% 3.64% 7.76% 19.05% 
LevDiff -4.45% -4.10% 2.21% -9.27% 0.30% 
GDP Growth 1.81% 2.20% 2.46% -8.20% 6.90% 
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics of Time-Series Variables (FDIC Level) 
 Variable Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 
FCostLarge 1.68% 1.36% 1.36% 0.19% 4.61% 
FCostSmall 2.10% 2.04% 1.26% 0.49% 4.95% 
FCostDiff 0.42% 0.46% 0.37% -0.47% 1.11% 
SizeLarge ($ billion) 150.26  151.15  39.92  90.46  223.01  
SizeSmall ($ billion) 0.14  0.14  0.03  0.09  0.19  





Table 5: Implicit Government Guarantee and BHC Funding Cost 
For funding cost, size and leverage, models below show the relationship between their averages 
and the average value of the government guarantee, which represent the expected value of the 
put option enjoyed by a firm under the implicit government guarantee. Independent factors are 
built here using data at the BHC Level from Compustat. All variables are quarterly form 2000 
Q1 to 2015 Q4. Robust t statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
FCostLarge -744.023***      
 [8.08]      
FCostSmall  -783.273***     
  [7.93]     
SizeLarge   0.053***    
   [3.77]    
SizeSmall    1.4048***   
    [6.34]   
LevLarge     -238.083***  
     [10.70]  
LevSmall      -333.166*** 
      [10.44] 
GDP 
Growth -6.096 -10.955 62.9131 46.834 54.223* 8.660 
 [0.12] [0.22] [1.19] [1.00] [1.79] [0.30] 
Constant 26.239*** 26.753*** 3.2488 -9.187** 57.098*** 60.959*** 
 [9.50] [9.43] [0.92] [2.42] [11.38] [11.24] 






Table 6: Implicit Government Guarantee and BHC Funding Cost Difference 
For funding cost, size and leverage, models below show the relationship between their averages 
and the average value of the government guarantee, which represent the expected value of the 
put option enjoyed by a firm under the implicit government guarantee. Independent factors are 
built here using data at the BHC Level from Compustat. A parameter for a variable with suffix 
“ACt” represents the change after the crisis. All variables are quarterly form 2000 Q1 to 2015 
Q4. Robust t statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
FCostDiff 5,442.95*** 2,357.35***     
 [5.77] [3.27]     
AC×FCostDiff  12,210.22***     
  [3.57]     
SizeDiff   
0.0532*
** -0.151***   
   [3.58] [3.70]   
AC×SizeDiff    0.162***   
    [6.00]   
LevDiff     325.379*** 
205.514
*** 
     [5.69] [3.64] 




      [6.87] 
GDP Growth 77.541 65.089 63.752 -10.107 109.939* 60.720* 
 [1.41] [1.62] [1.20] [0.24] [1.80] [1.79] 
Constant 13.691*** 8.895*** 3.9287 22.745*** 25.858*** 
14.488*
** 
 [7.45] [5.52] [1.12] [4.52] [6.91] [4.47] 






Table 7: Implicit Government Guarantee and FDIC Funding Cost 
For funding cost, size and leverage, models below show the relationship between their averages 
and the average value of the government guarantee, which represent the expected value of the 
put option enjoyed by a firm under the implicit government guarantee. Independent factors are 
built here using data at the depository Level from FDIC. All variables are quarterly form 2000 
Q1 to 2015 Q4. Robust t statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
FCostLarge -732.756***    
 [8.38]    
FCostSmall  -797.329***   
  [8.20]   
SizeLarge   0.253***  
   [8.32] 337.479*** 
SizeSmall    [8.59] 
     
GDP 
Growth -4.879 -24.868 102.103*** 98.051** 
 [0.10] [0.51] [2.73] [2.38] 
Constant 25.8*** 30.590*** -26.535*** -34.901*** 
 
[9.45] [9.76] [6.81] [7.18] 







Table 8: Implicit Government Guarantee and FDIC Funding Cost Difference 
For funding cost, size and leverage, models below show the relationship between their averages 
and the average value of the government guarantee, which represent the expected value of the 
put option enjoyed by a firm under the implicit government guarantee. Independent factors are 
built here using data at the depository Level from FDIC. A parameter for a variable with suffix 
“AC” represents the change after the crisis. All variables are quarterly form 2000 Q1 to 2015 
Q4. Robust t statistics in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1% 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
FCostDiff 939.128** -547.642**   
 [2.20] [2.09]   
AC×FCostDiff  3,536.689***   
  [4.68]   
SizeDiff   0.254*** -0.061 
   [8.32] [1.29] 
AC×SizeDiff    0.149*** 
    [6.15] 
GDP Growth 88.115 4.473 102.105*** -5.235 
 [1.46] [0.14] [2.73] [0.19] 
Constant 7.848*** 7.514*** -26.527*** 10.655* 
 
[3.80] [3.85] [6.81] [1.73] 

































































Figure 2.1. Dynamics of the Funding Costs for BHC banks 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Dynamics of the Funding Costs for FDIC banks 
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The corporate bond sector has grown tremendously over the past decade. Rapid 
growth in Chinese corporate indebtedness and corporates’ ability to pay back their 
liabilities have become a persistent concern for regulators and investors in recent years. 
In this paper, we examine the determinants of the pricing of Chinese corporate bonds 
and potential agency costs arising from implicit government guarantees (IGG) for state 
owned enterprises (SOEs). We show that the yield of central government SOE bonds 
is 85 bps lower than that of non-SOE bonds after controlling for firm-specific, bond-
specific characteristics, and macroeconomic variables. Further, quantifying IGG with 
(the lack of) bond yield sensitivity to equity volatility, we present evidence on the dark 
side of IGG – high IGG firms are subject to greater agency costs; they are more likely 





Implicit Government Guarantees and Agency Problems 
1. Introduction 
The rapid growth in Chinese corporate indebtedness and corporates’ ability to 
pay back their liabilities have become a persistent concern for regulators and investors 
in recent years. The annual issuance of corporate debt in the amount of 4.3 trillion 
CNY as of the end of 2017, from 8.5 billion CNY in 20001. Of this total, about 28.6% 
are central government bonds, 53.5% are local government bonds, and the rest are 
non-state owned enterprise bonds. It is well known that government tends to bail out 
state owned enterprises (SOEs) when they are in trouble. In this paper, we examine the 
determinants of the pricing of Chinese non-financial corporate bonds, which are 
publicly traded in the interbank bond market as well as the exchange markets, and 
potential agency costs of implicit government guarantees. 
A salient feature of the Chinese financial system is the active involvement of the 
China’s government in the economy (Brunnermeier, Sockin, and Xiong, 2017). State-
owned enterprises in China are established and backed by the central and local 
government. Unlike private owned companies, SOEs shoulder more political and 
social responsibilities than non-SOEs, such as creating jobs, supporting strategic 
industries, and maintaining stability. As a result, central and local governments 
typically subsidize SOEs, explicitly or implicitly. Investors considered bonds issued 
by stated owned enterprises in China’s domestic markets to have implicit guarantees 
                                                     
1 There are five types of corporate indebtedness: enterprise bonds, corporate bonds, medium term note 
(MTN), commercial paper, and private placement note (PPN). In 2017, the annual issuance amount of 
enterprise bonds is 373 billion CNY; that of corporate bonds is 1,102 billion CNY; that of MTN is 
1,037 billion CNY, that of commercial paper is 2,378 billion CNY; and that of PPN is 495 billion CNY.   
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by the government and are rarely default because the government would bail out 
systemically important enterprises when they are in financial distress. Bonds of SOEs 
are more like risk-free government bonds, instead of risky corporate bonds. Naturally, 
this feature has impacts on capital allocations across different assets. Industries 
populated with SOEs can easily attract capital with a lower financial cost than those 
mainly occupied non-SOEs. The government support has provided competing 
advantages for SOEs over non-SOEs though easy access to capitals, lower financial 
cost. 
On the other hand, state-owned enterprises are potentially negatively affected by 
government implicit guarantees. Specifically, implicit guarantees may directly 
influence the efficiency of SOEs through the potential agency cost on corporate 
managers. For example, most corporate managers are appointed by government 
officials. The ill-functional compensation plan provides little incentives for 
management to maximize shareholder’s interest. The high agency cost may weaken 
the disciplinary effect of debt and discourage managers from exerting efforts on 
project. The heavy policy burden, the manager’s incompetence, the collusion between 
two state agencies (local official and SOE manager) and the inflexible compensation 
schedule have caused an abnormally high agency costs, the low productivity and poor 
performance of a SOE. In addition, debtholders are less concerned with the defaults 
risk because of the implicit government guarantees on the debt of SOEs. This leads to 
monitor corporate investments.   
We first investigate whether there is an implicit government guarantee from 
governments. We find that, on average, yield of non-SOE bonds is about 85 bps higher 
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than that of the central government SOE (CG-SOE) bonds after controlling for firm-
specific, firm-specific characteristics, and macroeconomic variables. In addition, the 
yield of local government SOE (LG-SOE) bonds is about 18 bps higher than that of 
CG-SOE bonds. Our findings suggest that SOEs receive implicit government 
guarantees from both the central and local governments. Our results remain robust 
with a subsample of corporate bonds, enterprise bonds and medium term notes (MTN) 
and investment grade bonds and a subsample of investment grade bonds.  
Further, we extend the Merton (1974)’s theoretic framework to motivate the role 
of implicit government guarantees on bond pricing. In essence, the Merton framework 
predicts a positive relation between corporate bond yields and equity volatility. 
Nevertheless, the existence of IGG reduces the connection between bond yields and 
equity volatility. We, accordingly, measure IGG using bond yield sensitivity to equity 
volatility. In the subsequent empirical analysis, we demonstrate that the yield spread 
sensitivity to equity volatility measure can largely capture the benefit of implicit 
government guarantees. Defining the IGG as the negative equity volatility betas, we 
show that IGG is positively related to SOE dummy and negatively non-SOE dummy. 
Next we examine the effect of government guarantees on firm operating 
performance. This analysis is motivated by the fact that the presence of implicit 
government guarantees may foster the agency conflicts between shareholders and 
bondholders. We find an inverse relation between the magnitude of implicit guarantee 
of a firm and its operating performance, i.e. the operating performance is relatively 
lower for SOEs while higher for non-SOEs. We further study the implicit government 
guarantee effect on stock performance. Interesting, although the difference in 
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operating performance, we find that there is no significant difference in stock 
performance between SOEs and non-SOEs, suggesting that the implicit government 
guarantees are perceived by investors. After controlling for bond and firm 
characteristics, IGG is associated with positive stock performance. 
The paper contributes to the literature on implicit government guarantee in 
several perspectives. First, we find that SOEs enjoy lower debt financing cost than 
non-SOEs because of the implicit government guarantees from the central and local 
governments. Second, we propose a simple model and use yield spread sensitivity to 
equity volatility to quantify the implicit government guarantees. Third, we are among 
the first to look at the agency cost of implicit government guarantees from the 
perspective of corporate debt. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
background of Chinese non-government bond market and reviews the related literature 
of implicit government guarantees. Section 3 provides empirical framework and 
hypothesis. Section 4 introduces the data and summary statistics. Section 5 presents 
our empirical results, and section 6 concludes. 
2. Background and Literature Review 
2.1 Overview of the Chinese non-government bond market 
The Chinese bond market is dominated by government and government-related 
issues. According to Wind 2016 annual report, the size of the government and 
government related bonds is about $25 trillion at the end of 2016. While the market 
share of the corporate bonds is small, it has increased significantly over the last two 
decades.   
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In 1984, state owned-enterprises (SOEs) were allowed to issue corporate bonds 
subject to the approval of the central bank. In the early 1990s, local government 
obtained permission to enable local government-owned enterprises to issue bond and 
raised considerable amount of capital through the bond markets. Many of the issuers 
default and cause financial instability. To strengthen the regulation, the government 
armed the administrative rules and took steps to separate securities and banking 
industry, which led the size of the market fall back to the 1980 level. Consequently, all 
corporate bonds issued had AAA rating since 100% bank guarantee was required for 
issuance. In addition, the coupon rates were set by the government. The market grew 
slowly in 1990s with only a limited number of stated owned enterprises being allowed 
in the market. 
China’s corporate bond markets have experienced an unprecedented boom since 
the mid-2000s. In 2006, the first corporate bond without a third-party guarantee was 
issued, initiating the development of the real corporate credit market in China. The 
corporate bond market has increased significantly over the last decade. The annual 
number of issues grew more than 25 times and annual amount of issuance increased 
by almost 100 times from 2006 to 2016. 
2.2 Implicit guarantee by Chinese government 
It is well known that government tends to bail out big and systematically 
important firms when they are in trouble. During the 2008-2009 financial crisis, US 
government released the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and bailed out a 
large number of financial institutions.  For example, the total bailout amount of AIG is 
up to $182 billion. Moreover, real-sector firms that have been bailed out by their home 
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governments include Groupe Bull SA (France), Norilsk Nickel (Russia), Bangkok 
Land (Thailand), Malaysian Airline System (Malaysia), and Railtrack UK). Existing 
studies (e.g., O’Hara and Shaw, 1990, Ueda and di Mauro, 2013) show that such 
implicit guarantees have real implications for firms’ credit ratings and financing costs. 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China shoulder more political responsibilities 
than non-SOEs, such as creating jobs, supporting strategic industries, and maintaining 
stability. Central and local governments typically subsidize SOEs, explicitly or 
implicitly. Investors considered bonds issued by stated owned enterprises in China’s 
domestic markets to have implicit guarantees by the government and were optimistic 
that the government would bail out systemically important enterprises when they are 
in financial distress.  
However, in 2015, Baoding Tianwei Co., a state owned enterprises owned by the 
central government of China, announced its default on its interest payments. This 
became the first central government backed company to default on a domestic bond. 
Since Tianwei’s default in 2015, several large SOEs have defaulted or restructured 
debt.2 The serial defaults of SOEs indicate that the absence of government guarantees 
of Tianwei is not an isolated event, and the fact that the Chinese government would 
never let state owned borrowers default has officially become history.   
                                                     
2 In October 2015, Sinosteel Co., a state-owned steelmaker, failed to pay interest due on 2 billion CNY 
notes maturing in 2017. On March 28, 2016, Dongbei Special Steel Group, owned by the government 
of Liaoning province, failed to make an 852 million CNY bond payment and filed for bankruptcy on 
October 10, 2016. In April 2016, Shanxi Huayu, which is 49% owned by state-owned China National 
Coal Group Corp., failed to pay 637.7 million CNY in principal and interest on its domestic short-term 
commercial paper. In April 2016, China Railway Materials Co., China’s largest supplier of iron-rail 
track and other railroad building materials, suspended trading of 16.8 billion CNY worth of outstanding 
bonds and was pursuing potential debt restructuring plans with creditors. 
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2.3 Agency Cost and SOEs 
On the other hand, implicit guarantees may directly influence the profitability 
and efficiency of firms through their effect on the expectations of managers. The 
potential agency costs may discourage corporate managers from exerting efforts to 
maximize firm’s value and shareholder’s interest. Studies find that state ownership has 
a negative impact on the profitability and efficiency of firms (Megginson and Netter 
(2001)). Many different governments have sold their SOEs to private investors in 
hopes that the generally unsatisfactory operating performance of these firms can be 
improved by the discipline of private ownership. Alternatively, China has 
implemented major economic reforms with minimal privatization through the 
conversion of SOE governance into a modern corporate governance structure. 
Aviazian, Ge and Qiu (2005) find that corporatization has had a significantly positive 
impact on SOE performance. Moreover, the recent Split-Share Structure Reform, 
which converts all non-tradable share into legitimate tradable shares, has boosted SOE 
output, profits and employment (Liao, Liu and Wang, 2014).   
According to Zhou and Wang (2000), more than 90% SOE managers are directly 
appointed by their superior government official. The politician can manipulate the 
SOEs' behavior through the managers that they appointed. The incentives of SOE 
managers is to pursue political goods rather than to maximize firm’s value. Moreover, 
local governments are heavily involved in most of the investment decisions of SOEs. 
The heavy policy burden, the manager’s incompetence, and the collusion between two 
state agencies (local official and SOE manage) cause the low productivity and poor 
performance of a SOE. 
113 
 
In addition, the ill-functioning managerial incentive scheme have caused an 
abnormally high agency costs. SOEs offer low salaries and inflexible compensation to 
managers. The line between government official and SOE manager is ambiguous, and 
there are specified salaries for different ranks of government officials. It often happens 
that a SOE manager is paid according to her rank as government official instead of on 
her real managerial effort. 
3. Empirical Framework and Hypotheses 
3.1 Empirical Framework for Implicit Guarantee  
We approach the value of implicit guarantee from the perspective of equity 
volatility. We assume that the value of firm assets (v) follows Geometric Brownian 
motion. A firm issues debt and the face value of the debt is D. Assume that the bond 
only defaults at maturity. The value of the firm’s debt (d) has the following payoff: 
d D    (v > D)        
d v v  D       
      
We further rewrite the above equation as the following: 
  d = D – p        (2) 
where p has the following payoff: 
p 0     (v > D)  
p D - v v  D       
It should be noted that p is a put option with its exercise price at D. We name it as the 
default option. In words, debt may be considered as a risk free debt, D, minus value of 
the default put option.  This is consistent with Merton (1974) that the holders of risky 
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corporate bonds can be thought of as owners of riskless bonds who have issued put 
option to the holders of the firm’s equity.  
A phenomenon is that Chinese firms, particularly state owned enterprises (SOEs), 
rarely default their bonds. The first SOE default in 2015 indicates that the government 
will not fully back the debt of state-owned enterprises. Similarly, few defaults occur in 
the municipal bond market, and studies attribute the low default of municipal bonds as 
evidence to potential existence of an implicit government guarantee (IGG). We model 
IGG (in a particular form) below. If the firm asset value falls below D, but above K 
(<D), the government will bail out the firm. In other words, the government will not 
bail out a firm when its asset value is too low (below K, which is the lower bound for 
a firm to receive implicit guarantee from the government). As a result, we have the 
following expression for the value of the debt: 
  d = D           (v > K)       (4) 
  d = v            (v < K) 
Accordingly, the value of the guarantee is: 
g D - v     (D > v > K)       (5) 
g  0  v  K 
Jointly considering (4) and (5), the presence of guarantee lowers the firm’s 
default probability. We may consider the combination of the default put and the 
implicit guarantee as a straddle -- to short a put option at the exercise price of D (same 
as the default put) and in the meantime long a put option at the exercise K. The default 
put option value is reduced by the amount of IGG. We may consider g as a (different) 
put option that firm obtains from government (a free insurance). With IGG, value of 
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the put option is p - g. Consequently, bond value increases by g, resulting in a lower 
yield relative to a similar firm without IGG. 
3.2 Hypotheses 
The above framework following Merton (1974) has a clear implication -- based 
on Eq (2), when volatility increases, the value of put option increases, benefiting 
equityholders at the expenses of bondholders. Bond yields would be highly correlated 
with equity volatility (precisely, it should be asset volatility). Implicit government 
guarantees benefit bondholders, increasing bond value and lowering yields of bonds.  
This will make bond yields less connected with equity volatility.  
Hypothesis 1: Higher IGG indicates lower sensitivity to equity volatility. 
A side benefit is that the relationship between bond yields and equity volatility 
offers us a potential measure of a firm’s IGG. Following this idea, we quantify IGG of 
a firm using the lack of sensitivity in bond yields and equity volatility. This allows us 
to explore the dark side of an IGG.  
Having an IGG is not without costs. With an IGG, debtholders are less concerned 
with corporate defaults risk because of the implicit government guarantees on the debt 
of SOEs. In the model setting, when an IGG lowers the value of the default put, 
bondholders have a lower incentive to closely monitor equityholders. 
Noted in the literature, the conflict between debtholders and equityholders results 
in either underinvestment or overinvestment problems. In a financial system that 
debtholders are protected by the government when firms are in financial distress, the 
underinvestment problem would be less problematic. Rather, overinvestment is a 
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severe issue plaguing corporates.  As discussed in the introduction, most corporate 
senior managers are appointed by government officials. Their promotions typically are 
not performance driven; rather they are tied to the size of the company. Consequently, 
over-investment and empire building are expected to be prevalent in high IGG firms. 
This reasoning results in the second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: Agency cost is positively related to the implicit government 
guarantees. Thus, agency cost indicates lower yield spread volatility.  
4. Data  
Data on Chinese bond issuance, transaction and characteristics are provided by 
the WIND Information Co. Ltd. We obtain the bond issuance data, such as offering 
date, offering price, offering amount, coupon rate, coupon type, issue type, issuer type, 
credit ratings etc. For each bond transaction at day t, we observe its close price, 
trading volume and yield to maturity. Yield spread is then defined as the difference 
between the bond yield and the associated yield of the treasury yield curve at the same 
maturity. The accounting data is obtained from China Stock Market & Accounting 
Research (CSMAR). We use a sample period from 2006 to 2016. 
There are total of 29,740 bond issues from the sample period. We apply several 
data filters and exclude the following bond issues. 1) Bonds issues where the type of 
issuers (SOEs or non-SOEs) cannot be identified. 2) Offering dates, offering price and 
bond yields are missing.  
Table 1 reports the annual number of issuers and aggregate amount of issuance of 
all bonds and various bond issuers. We divide our sample into three subcategories by 
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issuer type: Central SOE, Local SOE and Non-SOE. Central SOE is a state owned 
enterprise (SOE) by Chinese central government; Local SOE is a state owned 
enterprise (SOE) by Chinese local government; and Non-SOE is an issuer not owned 
by the government. The number of bond issues has increased significantly over the 
last two decades. The annual number of issues grows from 297 in 2006 to 7878 in 
2016. The annual amount issued increases from 353 million CNY to 14 Trillion CNY. 
Table 2 reports the number of bond issues and bond yields of various bond issue 
types. According to WIND, bonds are classified by enterprise bonds (5,313 issues), 
corporate bonds (4,926 issues), medium term notes (4,427 issues), private placement 
notes (3,874 issues), commercial paper (10,519 issues) and financial bonds (492 
issues)3. The average bond yields of each subcategory are 5.94%, 5.22%, 4.87%, 
6.00%, 4.12%, and 4.35%, respectively. We further divide each bond issue category 
into three bond issuers. Non-SOEs tend to have higher bond yield than that of central 
SOEs and local SOEs. The average bond yields of non-SOEs are higher than the 
average for each issue types. 
Table 3 reports the number of bond issues and bond yield of various rating 
groups. The sample is classified into various rating groups, AAA (6,205 issues), AA+ 
(5,528 issues), AA (8,642 issues), AA- (657 issues), A (6,919 issues), BBB or lower 
(15 issues) and not rated (1,422 issues). The vast majority of Chinese bonds are rated 
                                                     
3 Enterprise bonds are the earliest type of corporate bonds issued in China. Many enterprise bonds trade 
in both the interbank market and exchange markets. They are usually issued by SOEs and guaranteed by 
one of the state-banks. Corporate bonds are issued by listed companies and traded in exchange. Listed 
company bonds are real credit bonds without bank guarantees. Commercial paper and mid-term note 
(MTN) are solely traded in the interbank market and usually issued by large corporations with good 
standing. Financial bonds are traded in the interbank market and issued by banks, finance companies, 
and other financial institutions. 
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AA or better. More than two thirds of bonds are rated AA or higher (21,032 out of 
29,388).  Only 15 issues are rated BBB or lower. 70% bonds issued by central SOE 
and 75% issued by local SOE receive AA ratings or higher. However, only 49% bonds 
issued by Non-SOEs receive AA ratings or higher. The average bond yields of each 
subcategory are 4.30%, 5.44%, 6.20, 7.22%, 4.44%, 4.17% and 6.53, respectively.  
In Table 4, we show the summary statistics of our sample. SOEs tend to have 
lower bond yield (including offering yield, bond trade yield and yield spread) than 
non-SOEs. The average rating of SOE bonds is 5.3, while the average rating is 4.2 for 
non-SOE bonds. The average firm size (total assets) of CG-SOEs and LG-SOEs are 
$6.7 billion and $12.7 billion; the average total assets of non-SOEs is only $2.2 billion. 
In addition, SOEs are more profitable in term of return on assets and return on equity. 
The equity volatility is estimated using the 252 days stock daily return.   
5. Empirical Results 
In this section, we examine the implicit government guarantees of state-owned 
enterprises using corporate bond data. First, we examine the relation between bond 
yield spread and issuer type. Second, following the model described before, we use 
equity volatility beta as a proxy of implicit guarantee to estimate the size of implicit 
guarantee. In contrast, we also look at the agency cost of implicit government 
guarantees by examining their operating and stock performance  
5.1 Implicit guarantee and yield spread 
We begin our empirical analysis by examining the relation between the yield 
spread and issuer type. Investors have long held the view that the Chinese government 
would never let large SOEs default since such an event might trigger severe instability 
119 
 
or collapse an entire industry or economy.  Livingston, Poon and Zhou (2018) find 
that bonds issued by SOEs receive higher ratings than those by the non-SOEs. We ask 
whether SOEs can borrow debts at a lower cost than non-SOEs by controlling for firm 
specific, bond specific and macroeconomic variables. We include a list of independent 
variables used in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Campbell and Taksler (2003), and 
Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007). The regression model is specified as follows: 
YS𝑖𝑗𝑡 = α0 + β1IGG𝑗 + β2Control + ϵ  (6) 
where YS𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the bond yield spread of bond i by firm j. The implicit government 
guarantee effect is estimated by the bond issuer type dummy. We also control a series 
of independent variables. We consider bond-specific variables, including credit rating, 
years to maturity and issuance amount. We also include two accounting variables: 
operating income to sales and long-term debt to assets. To control for macroeconomic 
variables, we use 1-year treasury rate, the difference between the 10- and 2- year 
Treasury rates. 
Table 5 reports regression results of bond yield spread on bond specific variables 
and macroeconomic variables. This allows us to use a large bond sample with 29,090 
bond issues of the bond offering sample and 85,887 quarterly observations of the bond 
trading sample. We perform industry and year fixed effect regression to control for 
industry and year influences on yield. In the first two columns, we use the bond 
offering sample, which include bonds are newly offered during the sample period. In 
the next two columns, the regression is estimated using bond trading data. There are 
three main issuer types: CG-SOE, LG- SOE and non-SOE. CG-SOE is a state owned 
enterprise (SOE) by Chinese central government; LG- SOE is a state owned enterprise 
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(SOE) by Chinese local government; and Non-SOE is an issuer not owned by the 
government. As we discussed earlier, we expect the yield of bonds issued by SOEs is 
lower than that of non-SOE because of implicit government guarantees. Further, yields 
of CG-SOE are even lower than that of LG-SOE because these bonds are backed by 
the central government. We consider bond specific variables: credit ratings, years to 
maturity and outstanding amount. Bond ratings are divided into 7 categories and we 
assign integer numbers to the credit rating, AAA=6, AA+=5, AA=4, AA-=3, A+ to A-
=2, BBB+ or below=1, not rated=0. Yield spreads are generally negatively related to 
credit ratings. We also include macroeconomic variables: 1 year treasury rate and the 
treasury slope, which is the difference between the 10 year and 2 year Treasury rates. 
Table 5 show the regression results. In column 1 and 3, we use the full sample 
which includes bonds with all issue types and bond ratings. We find that yield of non-
SOE is 103 bps higher than that of CG-SOE after controlling for bond characteristics 
and macroeconomic variables. In addition, the yield of LG-SOE is about 23 bps point 
higher than that of CG-SOE. This is consistent with our expectation that SOEs have 
lower default risk and lower yield spread due to the government support. In column 2 
and 4, we use a subsample of enterprise bonds, corporate bonds and medium-term note 
(MTN), which receive investment grade ratings. The results are consistent with the 
previous finding. We find SOE bonds tend to have lower yield spread than non-SOE 
bonds. It may be noted that the coefficient on rating is negative and significant, 
suggesting that bond yield is negatively related to the credit rating. Issuance amount, 




In Table 6, we control for both firm and bond specific variables. Since firm 
specific variables are only available to public listed firms, we end up with a much 
smaller sample. We have 4975 bond issues in the bond offering sample and 11055 
quarter bond trading observations in the bond trading sample. In column 1 and 2, we 
show the regression results of all bonds issued by public listed firms. Noticeably, the 
yield spread of non-SOE bonds is 85 bps higher than that of CG-SOE bonds after 
controlling for bond, firm and macroeconomic variables. Interestingly, in regression 2, 
equity volatility is not related to yield spread, suggesting that equity volatility has been 
priced in yield spread or might be explained by other control variables. We further 
examine the relation between yield spread and issuer type using bond trading data. 
The most telling finding is the consistent significance of the issuer type variables. The 
coefficients on non-SOE and LG-SOE variables are positive and significant, 
suggesting a higher yield than that of CG-SOE bonds. Consistent with Collin-
Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) and Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007), we find 
that leverage (long term debt to assets) is positively related to yield spread and income 
to sales are negatively related to the offering yield. 
5.2 Implicit guarantee and yield spread sensitivity to equity volatility 
Following the simple model laid out in the section 3, we use the sensitivity of 
yield spread to equity volatility to quantify the implicit government guarantee. The 
sensitivity is estimated as follows: 
YS𝑖𝑗𝑡 = α0 + β1Evol𝑗 + β2Rating + β3Size + ϵ  (7) 
where YS𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the bond yield spread of bond i by firm j. The equity volatility is 
estimated using past 252 daily stock return from CSMAR. We further control for bond 
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rating and firm size, which is estimated by the natural log of total assets. Betas are 
estimated over rolling 4-year periods for each bond and then used in the cross-
sectional regression. We estimate betas for each corporate bonds that has at least 4 
quarterly observations over the 16-quarter window.  
In the empirical framework section, we propose the idea that IGG reduce the 
sensitivity of a firm’s bond yields to volatility of the firm’s equity. As a result, we 
quantify the IGG as the negative equity volatility betas.  
  IGG = - β1̂        (8) 
where β1̂ is estimated from Eq. (7). 
In Table 4, the average betas of central SOEs and local SOEs are 0.423 and 
0.486, respectively; while the average betas of non-SOEs is 0.956. We further 
examine whether yield spread sensitivity can capture the implicit government 
guarantee effect. To do so, we estimate the following regression: 
  IGGj = α0 + β1Issuer Dummy𝑗 + Control + ϵ  (9) 
If IGG is indeed a good proxy of implicit guarantee, non-SOEs would have a 
high yield sensitivity to equity volatility, while SOEs tend to have relatively low yield 
sensitivity. The estimated results are reported in Table 7. As expected, non-SOE is 
associated with lower IGG, i.e. higher yield spread sensitivity. The results remain 
strong as we use various regression models, including ordinary least square (OLS), 
random effect, and fixed effect.  
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5.3 Agency Cost and SOEs 
With the implicit government guarantees, SOEs can issue bonds at a lower financing 
cost. On the other hand, IGG may cause high agency cost of SOEs. Debtholders are less 
concerned with corporate defaults risk because government tends to bail out SOEs 
when they are financial distress. In addition, the policy burden, incompetence of corporate 
managers and ill-functioning compensation scheme have caused a significantly high agency 
costs, which are important contributors to SOE’s inefficiency and low productivity. 
We examine the operation performance in terms of operating income to sales and return 
on assets. For each issuer type, we calculate the median operating ratio each year over the 
sample period from 2006-2016. Figure 1 shows the operating profitability ratios over the 
sample period. In figure 1.1, the median operating income to sale of non-SOEs (8.03) is 
significantly higher than that of CG-SOE (5.33) and LG-SOE (6.04), suggesting that non-
SOEs are more efficiency in operating income to sales. Similar, we find similar patterns in 
Figurer 1.2. But the difference of return on assets between SOEs and no-SOEs is narrowing 
down with the widest spread during 2007-2010. More interestingly, we notice that the 
difference of return on equity between SOEs and non-SOEs is much smaller in recent years.   
 We further examine the implicit government guarantee effect on corporate operating 
profitability. The regression model is specified as follows: 
OP𝑗𝑡 = α0 + β1IGG𝑗 + β2Control + ϵ  (10) 
where, OP is estimated by three measures of operating profitability: operating income to 
sales return on assets, and return on equity. We use issue type dummy and yield spread 
sensitivity as proxy of IGG. We also control for yield spread, leverage (long term debt to 
assets), natural log of asset, natural log of market capitalization. Table 8 reports regression 
results. The coefficients in column 1, 3 and 5 on non-SOE and LG-SOE dummy are positive 
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and significant, suggesting non-SOEs and LG-SOE are associated with higher operating 
profitability ratios than CG-SOEs. It is worth noting that non-SOEs tend to have a much better 
operating performance after controlling for firm and bond specific variables. For example, the 
operating income to sales is 6.14% higher than that of central SOEs. In column 2, 4, and 6, 
coefficients of Beta are negative and significant which shows that SOEs have lower 
operational profitability when the IGG is high. Consistent with the evidence in Section 5.2, we 
show that equity volatility Beta is a good proxy to capture the IGG effect. Further, we study 
the stock performance. Similarly, we calculate the median annual stock return each year for 
each issuer type. However, in figure 2, we find the annual stock return of SOEs and non-SOEs 
move almost synchronically over the sample period. Stock return movement reflects the 
intrinsic value of underlying stock, which is associated with the firm’s operating efficiency. 
Despite the relatively low operating performance of SOEs, the stock tends to perform 
similarly non-SOEs. We attribute the synchronically stock performance to the implicit 
government guarantees.  Then we examine the implicit government guarantee effect on stock 
performance. We estimate the following regression:  
Ret𝑗𝑡 = α0 + β1IGG𝑗 + β2Control + ϵ  (11) 
where, ret is the stock return in quarter t. We include the IGG proxy (issuer type dummy and 
yield spread sensitivity), bond and firm-specific characteristics variables. Generally, stock 
performance is the mirror of the operating performance. In Table 9, we examine the 
relationship between stock return and IGG proxy. One might expect that investors might 
perceive the implicit government guarantee. Thus, IGG is associated with positive stock 
performance. Column 1 is the base model with only bond and firm specific variables. Column 
2 we use the issuer type as IGG proxy, while in column 3 we use the equity volatility beta. 
Interestingly, we show that coefficient on non-SOE dummy is negative and significant, 
suggesting that non-SOE is associated with negative stock performance. The coefficient on 
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LG-SOE is negative but insignificant. Central SOEs are backed by the central government 
with a stronger commitment to bail out the troubled SOEs, but there is no significant 
difference between LG-SOE and CG-SOE. The equity volatility beta is positive and 
significant at 5% level, suggesting that Non-SOE firms have poorer stock performance than 
SOEs, and the less sensitive to equity volatility the higher stock performance. These facts may 
confirm our thoughts that stock market investors have expectation of implicit government 
guarantee for SOEs, which results in the higher SOEs stock performance and the contrary 
operational profits simultaneously. 
6. Conclusion 
We examine the determinants of the pricing of Chinese corporate bonds and 
potential agency costs of implicit government guarantees. We find strong evidence 
that SOEs enjoy lower debt financing cost. Yield spread of CG-SOE bonds is 14 bps 
and 85 bps lower than that of LG-SOE and non-SOE, respectively. Our results remain 
consistent and strong when we control for a series bond-specific, firm-specific and 
macroeconomic variables.  
Building a simple framework which considers the implicit government guarantee 
as the put option, we use yield spread sensitivity to equity volatility as an proxy for 
implicit government guarantee. We show that yield spread sensitivity can largely 
capture the effect of implicit government guarantee. Moreover, we examine the 
agency cost of implicit government guarantees. SOEs tend to underperform non-SOEs 
in terms of operating income to sales, return on assets and return on equity. Despite 
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Table 1. Numbers and Amount of Bonds Issue in China 
This tables shows the number of public bond issues by types of issuers from 2006 - 2016. CG-
SOEs are state-owned enterprises of central government of China. LG-SOEs are state-owned 
enterprises of the Chinese local governments. Non-SOEs are issuers not owned by the non-
SOEs. Majority of the non-SOEs are private companies. The issue amount is nominated in the 
chinese currency (CNY) and in thousand. 
  Number of Bond Issuers Issue Amount 
Year CG-SOE LG-SOE Non-SOE All CG-SOE LG-SOE Non-SOE All 
2006 116 150 75 297 200,730 135,710 16,250 352,690 
2007 95 165 101 298 221,670 164,600 22,310 408,580 
2008 128 186 96 346 468,130 231,910 27,550 727,590 
2009 221 443 99 715 873,298 656,890 48,885 1,579,073 
2010 226 601 140 920 718,130 724,580 59,765 1,502,475 
2011 321 854 318 1440 1,030,570 999,180 199,500 2,229,250 
2012 568 1752 641 2895 1,873,030 1,935,660 320,266 4,128,956 
2013 625 1836 877 3233 1,685,580 2,030,428 414,089 4,130,097 
2014 832 3385 1023 5084 1,912,974 3,493,296 511,459 5,917,729 
2015 1034 4006 1428 6282 2,391,545 3,836,279 1,116,025 7,343,849 
2016 1118 5141 1786 7878 2,600,986 4,846,987 1,608,899 9,056,872 





Table 2. Bond Yields and Bond Issue Types 
This table shows the number of bond issues and bond yield by different types of bond 
issues from 2006 - 2016. CG-SOEs are state-owned enterprises of central government 
of China. LG-SOEs are state-owned enterprises of the Chinese local governments. 
Non-SOEs are issuers not owned by the non-SOEs. Majority of the non-SOEs are 
private companies. There are five types of non-governmental public bonds: enterprise 
bonds, corporate bonds, medium term notes (MTN), private placement notes (PPN), 
and commercial paper. Bond yield are the yield at the bond offering. 
















Enterprise Bonds 256 4876 181 5313 4.79 6.15 6.58 5.94 
Corporate Bonds 385 2781 1760 4926 4.06 5.19 5.86 5.22 
Medium Term Notes 942 2791 694 4427 4.41 5.17 5.46 4.87 
Private Placement 
Notes 461 2643 607 3711 5.33 6.06 6.57 6.00 




Table 3. Bond Yields and Ratings Groups 
This Table reports the number of bond issues by rating and issuer types. CG-SOEs 
are state-owned enterprises of central government of China. LG-SOEs are state-
owned enterprises of the Chinese local governments. Non-SOEs are issuers not 
owned by the non-SOEs. Majority of the non-SOEs are private companies. Bond 
ratings are divided into 7 categories: AAA, AA+, AA, AA-, A (A+ to A-), non-
investment grade (NI), which is rated BBB+ or lower, and not rated (NR). 
















AAA 2834 3113 258 6205 4.10 4.65 4.50 4.30 
AA+ 522 4206 800 5528 4.88 5.52 5.38 5.44 
AA 260 6463 1919 8642 5.33 6.20 6.32 6.20 
AA- 22 320 315 657 7.29 7.02 7.45 7.22 
A 1552 3545 1822 6919 4.09 4.56 4.84 4.44 
NI 2 1 12 15 3.33 10.00 4.82 4.17 
NR 92 871 459 1422 5.46 6.74 6.66 6.53 
Total 29388 5284 18519 5585                               
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Table 4. Summary Statistics 
This table shows summary statistics of bond and firm variables. We include bond offering yield, trading 
yield, yield spread and credit ratings. Yield spread is then defined as the difference between the bond yield 
and the associated yield of the treasury yield curve at the same maturity. Bond ratings are divided into 7 
categories and we assign integer numbers to the credit rating, AAA=6, AA+=5, AA=4, AA-=3, A+ to A-
=2, BBB+ or below=1, not rated=0. We also include total assets (in millions), market cap (in millions), 
which is the market value of equity, income to sales, return on assets, return on equity, long term debt to 
assets, daily equity volatility, quarterly stock return and yield spread sensitivity to equity volatility (Beta).  
 
Full Sample CG-SOE LG-SOE Non-SOE 
VARIABLES Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Offering Yield 5.82 1.28 5.15 1.04 5.51 1.11 6.21 1.31 
Yield 5.46 1.29 4.81 0.88 5.04 1.06 5.91 1.35 
Yield Spread 2.49 1.26 1.67 0.77 2.00 0.96 3.02 1.30 
Rating 4.63 0.86 5.33 0.83 4.98 0.81 4.21 0.64 
Total Assets 3,444.9    6,767.3    9,087.0    12,749.0    2,746.2    3,089.8    2,249.7    4,901.4  
Market Cap 1,882.7    2,263.6    3,454.6      3,957.7    1,513.8    1,721.7    1,656.3    1,619.6  
Income to Sales 8.55 12.80 7.40 10.80 9.17 15.15 8.50 11.73 
ROA 3.82 2.91 3.41 2.45 3.19 2.43 4.33 3.20 
ROE 5.19 5.12 4.98 4.30 3.87 4.59 6.05 5.47 
LT Debt/ Assets 0.21 0.11 0.23 0.13 0.24 0.10 0.18 0.09 
Equity Volatility 3.98 0.56 3.90 0.62 3.99 0.53 4.01 0.56 
Return 3.27 8.93 3.76 7.84 3.09 6.53 3.25 10.39 
Beta 0.67 1.57 0.42 1.26 0.49 1.09 0.96 2.00 
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This table reports the regression results of bond yield on issuer type, 
bond specific variables and macroeconomic variables. CG-SOE is a 
state owned enterprise (SOE) by Chinese central government; LG-
SOE is a state owned enterprise (SOE) by Chinese local government; 
and Non-SOE is an issuer not owned by the government. We consider 
bond specific variables: credit ratings, years to maturity and 
outstanding amount. Bond ratings are divided into 7 categories and 
we assign integer numbers to the credit rating, AAA=6, AA+=5, 
AA=4, AA-=3, A+ to A-=2, BBB+ or below=1, not rated=0. We also 
include macroeconomic variables: 1 year treasury rate and the 
treasury slope, which is the difference between the 10 year and 2 year 
Treasury rates. We use two different samples: the full sample and a 
subsample with investment grade enterprise bonds, corporate bonds, 
and MTN. We use robust standard error to calculate t value. T-
statistics are presented in parentheses. The industry is the fixed effect. 
*, ** or *** signifies significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, 
respectively. 
  Offering Yield Spread Trading Yield Spread 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
LG-SOE 0.261*** 0.485*** 0.226*** 0.276*** 
 
(16.56) (11.92) (17.21) (9.51) 
Non-SOE 1.022*** 1.266*** 1.039*** 1.177*** 
 
(46.05) (28.05) (52.60) (37.50) 
Rating -0.054*** -0.364*** -0.460*** -0.351*** 
 
(-11.05) (-33.87) (-86.03) (-43.13) 
Maturity (years) 0.016*** -0.056*** -0.003*** 0.009*** 
 
(6.24) (-8.46) (-8.33) (13.66) 
Log(Amount) -0.385*** -0.198*** -0.274*** -0.403*** 
 
(-63.14) (-19.72) (-38.71) (-41.60) 
T-1 year 0.730*** 0.639*** 0.331*** 0.369*** 
 
(59.12) (33.70) (45.44) (44.71) 
Tslope 0.871*** 0.952*** 0.813*** 1.064*** 
 
(35.15) (25.62) (53.64) (55.78) 
Constant 2.467*** 3.188*** 4.964*** 4.879*** 
 
(41.75) (37.20) (80.42) (60.78) 
Observations 29,090 11,555 85,887 67,965 
R-squared 0.367 0.448 0.265 0.180 
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 Table 6. Regression of Yield Spread on Implicit Government Guarantees 
 This table reports the regression results of yield spread on issuer type, equity 
volatility, bond specific, firm specific variables and macroeconomic variables. CG-
SOE is a state owned enterprise (SOE) by Chinese central government; LG-SOE is a 
state owned enterprise (SOE) by Chinese local government; and Non-SOE is an issuer 
not owned by the government. We consider bond specific variables: credit ratings, 
years to maturity and natural log of outstanding amount; firm specific variables: long-
term debt to assets and operating income to sales. We also include macroeconomic 
variables: 1 year treasury rate and the treasury slope, which is the difference between 
the 10 year and 2 year Treasury rates. We use two different samples: bond offering 
sample and bond trading sample. We use robust standard error to calculate t value. T-
statistics are presented in parentheses. The industry is the fixed effect. *, ** or *** 
signifies significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively. 
  Offering Yield Spread Trading Yield Spread 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 




























    
-0.024** 
     
(-2.44) 
Rating 0.038*** -0.005 -0.497*** -0.656*** -0.639*** 
 
(3.78) (-0.52) (-28.56) (-40.14) (-33.78) 
Log(Amount) -0.322*** -0.402*** -0.190*** -0.144*** -0.150*** 
 
(-19.78) (-24.09) (-12.78) (-8.85) (-8.23) 
Maturity -0.046*** -0.022*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** 
 
(-7.61) (-3.50) (-11.84) (-10.67) (-9.54) 
LT Debt to Assets 1.026*** 1.033*** 0.853*** 0.736*** 0.846*** 
 
(7.67) (7.26) (7.92) (6.20) (6.18) 
Income to Sales -0.012*** -0.007*** -0.020*** -0.013*** -0.015*** 
 
(-8.72) (-4.92) (-18.79) (-13.78) (-13.83) 
T-1 year 0.799*** 0.717*** 0.235*** 0.222*** 0.245*** 
 
(26.87) (21.42) (10.44) (8.49) (8.77) 
Tslope 0.968*** 0.774*** 0.782*** 0.750*** 0.711*** 
 
(17.44) (13.19) (17.34) (15.38) (12.35) 
Constant 1.290*** 2.528*** 4.892*** 5.383*** 5.572*** 
 
(8.04) (13.46) (35.68) (34.02) (35.49) 
Observations 4,972 4,972 11,055 8,551 7,016 
R-squared 0.361 0.286 0.413 0.382 0.381 
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Table 7. Equity Sensitivity and Implicit Government Guarantees 
The dependent variables are estimated over rolling 4-year 
periods for each bond and then used in the cross-sectional 
regression. We estimate betas for each corporate bonds that 
has at least 4 quarterly observations over the 16-quarter 
window. We include the bond issuer dummy, log of total 
assets, long term debt to assets, income to sales, and credit 
ratings. We estimate using OLS, random effect and firm fixed 
effect.  We use robust standard error to calculate t value. T-
statistics are presented in parentheses. The industry is the fixed 
effect. *, ** or *** signifies significance at the 10%, 5%, or 
1% level, respectively 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES OLS RE FE 
        
LG-SOE -0.235*** -0.206** -0.140* 
 
(-2.87) (-2.25) (-1.68) 
Non-SOE -0.404*** -0.352*** -0.238** 
 
(-5.13) (-3.66) (-2.22) 
Log (Assets) 0.129*** 0.128*** 0.180*** 
 
(4.29) (4.67) (6.78) 
LT Debt/Assets -0.309 -0.297 -0.265 
 
(-1.10) (-1.13) (-0.86) 
Income to Sales -0.003 -0.003 -0.005* 
 
(-1.28) (-1.33) (-1.70) 
Rating 0.140*** 0.140*** 0.113** 
 
(2.64) (2.93) (2.41) 
Constant 0.130** 0.210* 3.606*** 
 
(1.97) (1.96) (10.15) 
Observations 7,033 7,016 7,016 
R-squared 0.092 0.176 0.180 
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Table 8. Regression of IGG and Operating Profitability 
This table reports the regression results of IGG effect on operating profitability. The 
operating profitability are measured by operating income to sales, return on assets and 
return on equity. We use issuer type dummy and equity sensitivity (beta) as proxy of IGG. 
CG-SOE is a state owned enterprise (SOE) by Chinese central government; LG-SOE is a 
state owned enterprise (SOE) by Chinese local government; and Non-SOE is an issuer not 
owned by the government. We also control other variables, including yield spread, long 
term debt to assets and the natural log of firm size (assets and market capitalization). We 
use robust standard error to calculate t value. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. The 
industry is the fixed effect. *, ** or *** signifies significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, 
respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES OIS OIS ROA ROA ROE ROE 






































Yield Spread -2.547*** -1.885*** -0.608*** -0.350*** -1.105*** -0.507*** 
 
(-18.99) (-13.94) (-20.36) (-11.12) (-13.95) (-6.02) 
LT Debt -15.641*** -23.931*** -4.441*** -5.950*** -5.563*** -9.502*** 
/Assets (-10.20) (-12.72) (-14.58) (-15.91) (-8.41) (-11.32) 
Log (Assets) -0.719*** -1.344*** 
    
 
(-6.57) (-10.66) 
    Log(Mkt Cap) 
  
0.405*** 0.492*** 1.461*** 1.722*** 
   
(10.95) (11.35) (19.29) (18.48) 
Constant 24.489*** 38.013*** 1.947*** 1.973*** -3.954*** -4.823*** 
 
(13.15) (18.34) (5.95) (5.53) (-5.81) (-6.23) 
Observations 11,055 7,016 11,055 7,016 11,055 7,016 





Table 9. Regression Results of IGG Effect on Stock Performance 
This table reports the regression results of IGG effect on stock performance. 
We use issuer type dummy and sensitivity of yield spread to equity (beta) as 
proxy of IGG. CG-SOE is a state owned enterprise (SOE) by Chinese central 
government; LG-SOE is a state owned enterprise (SOE) by Chinese local 
government; and Non-SOE is an issuer not owned by the government. We also 
control other variables, including bond yield spread, credit rating, long term 
debt to assets, natural log of total assets, market to boo ratio, and return on 
equity. We use robust standard error to calculate t value. T-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. The industry is the fixed effect. *, ** or *** signifies 
significance at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level, respectively.  
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Ret Ret Ret 
















   
(2.23) 
Yield Spread 0.373* 0.520** 0.927*** 
 
(1.80) (2.43) (3.73) 
Rating 0.758* 0.439 1.211*** 
 
(1.94) (1.09) (2.61) 
LT Debt/Assets 0.438 -0.104 -1.547 
 
(0.19) (-0.04) (-0.56) 
Log (Assets) 0.206 0.207 0.161 
 
(0.92) (0.88) (0.61) 
M/B 2.818*** 2.852*** 2.902*** 
 
(15.61) (15.47) (11.50) 
ROE 0.077** 0.094*** 0.113*** 
 
(2.19) (2.65) (2.70) 
Constant -10.775*** -8.832** -12.719*** 
 
(-3.30) (-2.42) (-3.12) 
Observations 11,055 11,055 7,016 
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Figure 1.2 Return on Assets
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Figure 1.3 Return on Equity
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